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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
An examination of German strategy in the Mediterranean during 
World War II raises many questions. Probably the most perplexing is why 
Germany failed to capture the island of Malta, which, as a British air 
and naval base, consistently hampered Axis efforts in the area. Such a 
conquest could have secured the central Mediterranean for the Axis, a 
necessary condition for the safe passage of Axis convoys from Italy to 
Libya. Perhaps more than in any other theater of war, victory in North 
Africa depended on logistics. The chronic problem of the Afrlka Korps 
In its attempt to defeat the British 8th Army and capture Suez was lack 
of supplies, and the capture of Malta was the key to its solution. 
Germany's prewar strategy encompassed no plan for the conduct of 
Mediterranean operations beyond limited aid to her Italian ally. 
Germany relegated the Mediterranean to Italy, and it was only when the 
failures of her Axis partner lit thè Balkans jeopardized the success of 
German continental strategy and threatened Italy's allegiance to the 
alliance that Germany Intervened and assumed a major role in determining 
Mediterranean strategy. Mbreover, Hitler's concern for the Duce's 
prestige as a war leader at times affected German participation in the 
Mediterranean war, and thus a study of German strategy in the area 
necessitates an examination of the Italian role in shaping, aiding, or 
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hinderlng the formation and execution of that strategy. 
The major tfediterranean goals for the Axis during World War II 
were Gibraltar and Suez. The former depended upon Spain's cooperation, 
"but Franco successfully evaded any such commitment. The capture of Suez 
was a prize worthy of a total Axis effort, hut one in which the primary 
requisite would "be a secure supply line to Italy, and this necessarily 
involved the capture of Malta, After a study of German strategy in the 
Mediterranean and the strategic decisions which led to the defeat of the 
Afrika Korps at El Alamein, one can only conclude that the failure to 
secure Malta was one of Gennany's major strategic blunders of the war. 
What was the reason for this failure? A perfunctory explanation 
is that Hitler and the German Supreme Command held a singular, continen­
tal outlook and a reluctance for operations across water. Yet in May 
1941 German airborne forces assaulted and captured the heavily defended 
island of Crete, an operation of far less strategic value for the future 
conduct of Mediterranean operations than the proposed capture of Malta, 
Another partial explanation oft%i advanced for Germany's failure 
to capture Malta is the problem of Axis cooperation, Belatlons between 
the Axis military staffs were consistently poor, Altho\igh the personal 
relationship between Hitler and Mussolini varied during the war years, 
there was a basic mistrust which Jeopardized Uie possibilities for 
complete Italo-German agreement in the Mediterranean theater of war. 
Only once during World War II did the Axis powers form a joint military 
staff for a combined military operation. This unique undertaking in the 
summer of 194^2 was Intended for a single operation—the capture of 
Malta, codenamed Operation Herfcules, 
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The Axis powers never implemented Operation Herfcules, After 
several delays and postponements, the plan was finally cancelled. 
Although Hitler blamed the lack of Italian cooperation for the German 
decision to cancel Herfcules, a study of the operational and logistical 
planning for the capture of Malta reveals that Italy was fully committed 
to the operation, and that the problems of Axis cooperation were 
apparently overcome. The Italiems "blamed General Rommel's advance into 
Egypt in the summer of 1^2 as the deciding factor in the cancellation 
of Operation Herkules, while Eommel held O.KoW.,^ and indirectly Hitler, 
accountable for the failure to capture the island. Which, if any, of 
these reasons caused cancellation of Operation Herkules? 
First of all, any would-be invader of Malta has to consider 
certain geographical features of the island. The Maltese Islands lie 
between Europe and Africa in the Sicilian Straits, which connect the 
eastern and the western basins of the Mediterranean Sea, The group 
consists of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, and the uninhabited 
rocks of Cominotto and Filfla. Malta, the largest and most important 
island in the archipelago, is 17»5 miles long and 8.5 miles wide, with a 
total area of 9^.9 square miles. It lies 58 miles south of the Siôilian 
2 
coast and I80 miles east-southeast of Cape Bon in Tunisia. In June 
3 
19^0 the total population of the islands was approximately 300,000. 
^berkommando der Wehrmacht, the Supreme Command of the German 
Armed Forces. It is generally referred to as O.E.W. 
^"Malta," Chambers Encyclopaédia. I966, IK, I6-I7. 
^lan Cameron, Red Duster. White Ensign (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., i960), I5. 
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Structurally, Malta consists of a limestone "base with signifi­
cant outcroppings producing a gently undulating topography and sparse 
vegetation. The south and west coasts of tiae island are largely 
hartwrless with steep cliffs rising to 400 feet in elevation^ while on 
the north, and east the Interior Is easily accessible to an inrader, with 
good harbors such as St, Paul's Bay, Valetta, and Marsa Scirocco. 
Although Malta has long "been recognized as a valuable strategic 
prize 'because of its location in the central Mediterranean, historically 
the island has never "been considered impregnable « Originally settled "by 
Phoenician tradera, the island has changed ownership many times, Malta 
first became an Important naval base under Roman rule. After the 
decline of Borne, Malta passed to Arab control, which lasted for 200 
years, until the Norman conquest returned the Island to Christian rule. 
Malta regained its l2g)ortance as a naval base under the Angevin kings, 
and became a sally port for Christian adventurers in the Crwades,^ 
In the sixteenth century Malta became part of the empire of 
Charles V, In 1530 Charles transferred control of the island to the 
knights of the Order of the Hospital of St, John of Jerusalem in 
recognition of their long service to Christendom. The knights built up 
the island's fortifications and accumulated wealth by pirating against 
the Turks and their North African allies. The Turks, under Suleiman the 
Magilflcent, decided to end this affront, capture the Island, and 
^Them. Zammit, Malta, the Islands and Their Slstorv (Valetta, 
Malta: The Malta Herald Office. 192^). 4-8. Hereafter cited as Zammit, 
tfaJLta. 
^rbldn. 69-90. 
exterminate the offenders, Mustapha Pasha began the Great Siege of 
Malta in Ifey 1^6$, By September, however, the defenders were victorious 
and had checked the advance of Muslim power in the Mediterranean»^ Any 
German strategist in 19^0 could read from this lesson that, properly 
fortified, ^falta was defensible against a far superior force. 
The rule of the kni^ts ended in June I798, when Napoleon 
captured the Island on his way to Egypt, Long tired of the knl^ts' 
oppression, the Maltese at first welcomed the French invader. Napoleon 
hoped to make Malta a center of French trade and naval strength in the 
Mediterranean, "but his hopes were shortlived. The island's populace, 
disenchanted with the French Revolutionary reforms, revolted against the 
French on 2 September 1798 and requested the support of the British war 
fleet. After the surrender of the French garrison, the Maltese requested 
British sovereignty over the Island."^ The Congress of Vienna confirmed 
Britain's control of Malta in I815. 
Britain recognized the strategic importance of the island, and 
during the nlneteaith century developed its capalblllties as a naval 
fortress, In World War I Malta was the Allies ' chief naval "base in the 
Mediterranean, serving as a depot for the dispatch of "both men and 
supplies. During the postwar years, however, Malta's defenses fell into 
disrepair. Unwilling to pay the cost of even homeland defense, Britâin 
had little left over for Malta's needs, 
Britain's prewar military and naval position in the Mediterranean 
—-_e Bradford, The Great Siege (London: Hodder and S tough ton, 
1961), 15-20. 
"^Zammit, Malta. 243-86, 
rested upon three pillars of strength, Gibraltar guarded the western 
entrance to the sea, Alexandria secured the eastern "basin and the Suez 
Canal, while Malta, If properly armed, dominated the central tfediterran-
ean narrows and east-west maritime traffic. The confrontation between 
Britain and Italy over the Ethiopian crisis in 1935> however, forced 
Britain to reconsider her Mediterranean defenses. The British govern­
ment was concerned that Mussolini's irritation at British intervention 
in the dispute through the League of Nations might cause the Duce to 
take some military action against Britain In the Mediterranean. 
Althou^ British officials generally referred to this possibility as the 
"mad dog act," the threat of an Italian attack, particularly hy the 
Ô Q 
Begia Aeronautlca, could not "be discounted.^ The most obvious place 
for such an attack was Malta, head-quarters for the Mediterranean fleet 
and situated only half an hour's flight from the Sicilian airfields. 
The advent of aerial warfare changed Malta's defensive outlook, 
which in the past had been directed seaward. The greatest threat to the 
island in 1935 came not from the sea but from the air. To face this new 
challenge, however, Ifelta was without a single anti-aircraft battery, 
and Its aircraft were few and outdated compared with those of the Eegla 
Aeronautlca. Alerted to the Italian danger, the British foreign 
ministry recommended the immediate shipment to Malta of anti-aircraft 
guns, searchli^ts, and any available aircraft. In considering this 
recommendation, the Chiefs of Staff made a complete study of the Island 
O 
The Eoyal Italian Air Force. 
Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, I962), 282, 296. 
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and agreed that its air defenses were inadeqLuate, "but took no action to 
rectify the situation.^® Instead^ rather than expose the fleet at Malta 
to the danger of aerial attack, the Admiralty ordered the ships to 
11 
Alexandria» 
By the late 1930s, however, some measure of iiKprovemsnt had "been 
gained against a possible Italian attack. Modernization of the port 
begstn in July 1937 with the construction of boom defenses, underground 
storages, and a new airfield at Luq,a„ The Committee of Imperial Defence 
approved the addition of 112 heavy and 6o light anti-aircraft guns, 2k 
XP 
searchlights, and four fighter squadrons. However, the armed forces 
debated whether such improvements could enable the island to withstand a 
concentrated attack* 
The Admiralty took the lead in urging that Malta's defenses be 
increased to insure its availability as a naval base in the event of a 
Mediterranean war. The naval staff considered Alexandria a poor second 
choice as headquarters for the fleet because its location in the eastern 
basin limited its effective range of operations and because its harbor 
facilities were far less adequate than those at Malta, On the other 
hand, the air ministry advised evacuation of the island. It believed 
that in a Mediterranean war Malta could not be adequately defended 
against the Italian Air Force, and hesitated in committing air units to 
^%den. Facing the Dictators. 279, 284. 
S, 0. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle last. Vol, I; 
The Early Suoceeses Against Italy; Vol. II; The Germans Come to the Hélp 
of Their AUvs Vol, III: British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954-60), I, 31, 
^^Ibld.. 29-30. 
-,Q« 
the island, 
The result of this Indecision was that only half measures were 
taken to provide adequate defense. None of the air squadrons and only-
one- quarter of the anti-aircraft batteries determined as necessary by 
the Council of Defence in 1937 reached Malta before the start of World 
War II. British prewar leaders decided that in the event of a war with 
both Germany and Italy, the central Mediterranean could not be defended, 
Malta would probably have to be abandoned and the Mediterranean sealed 
off at Glbmltar and Suez, which action would lasan the employment of the 
long Cape route for British convoys,British naval forces based at 
Alexandria would control the eastern, basin, while the French Navy would 
l5 
be responsible for the securing of the western basin, 
British prewar strategy failed to recognize that ffeilta's primary 
offensive role was not to provide a base of operations for the British 
Mediterranean fleet, as the naval staff proposed, Malta's importance 
rested mors on its capability as an air aad submarine base against enemy 
shipping In the central Mediterranean,. Malta-based aircraft could also 
provide the vital air support necessary for British naval operations in 
^^Playfair, The Med 1 terranesn and Middle East. I, 30, 
^^Eaymond de Belot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean, trans, 
by James A. Field Jr. (Princeton, îî.J»; Princeton Univei^llgr Press, 
19^1), 5^-55» A coi^arlson of the Mediterranean and Cape routes: 
Distance Via the Cane Via the Mediterranean Difference 
London-Alexandria ïl%ëo8 miles 3,097 miles 8,511 miles 
London-Boaibay 10,800 miles 6,280 miles 4,^20 miles 
London-Singapore 11,750 miles 8,250 miles 3,500 miles 
^^Ibld.. 9. 
the area and strike at Italian Tîases In Sicily. With a central supply 
•base In the heart of Italian convoy routes, suTamarlnes "based at ffeJLta 
could gain a tremendous advantage. Yet British lack of foresight in the 
1930s accounted for the failure to provide sntniarine pens against aerial 
attack or underground hangars for Its aircraft—a relatively 8li%)le task 
due to the limestone structure of the Island, In preparation for a 
Mediterranean war, Malta's defense raiiier than its a"bandonnient deserved 
closer attention. Only a few prior to 19^0 recognized the real strate­
gic iiig)ortance of the Island as the "unslnkahle aircraft carrier. 
But If British planners overlooked the ingortance of Malta, their 
Italian countei^)arts did likewise. 
Geographically, Italy's position made her extremely dependent on 
sea communications, particularly because of the Inadequacy of her own 
raw materials and the needs of her North African empire. Since she was 
preparing for war with the world's greatest naval power, it was vital 
that Italy at least secure the Medlterranean at the Sicilian Straits, 
What appeared to he a relatively simple action would divide the Mediter­
ranean In two, so that the Italian Navy would not have to worry about 
18 
fighting the combined Allied fleet. 
The Italian Navy recognized Malta's decisive Insportance to the 
conduct of war in the Mediterranean. In 1938 iiaval advisers proposed to 
^^onald Miaclntyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean (New York: 
W. W, Norton & Company, lao,., 1964), 28, 
^"^Wlaston S, Chtarchlll, Their rinaet Hour (New York; Bantam 
Books, 19:^9), 378-80, 428-30. 
'Antonio Bmgadia, The Italian Navy In World War II. trans, 
"by Gal© (Aîjaapolîs, Ml,: U.S. Naval Institute, I957), 19-20. 
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Coimnando Supreaao^^ a plan for the capture of the island "based on close 
air support» Mussolini rejected the plan when air strategists expressed 
a reluctance to cooperate in a combined land-sea operation. The Duce 
preferred the air force argument that the Island's offensive capabili­
ties could be eliminated by air attack alone. The Italian Navy was 
unwilling to undertake the task without full cooperation from the Eegia 
20 
Aeronautica, and the plan was shelved. More concerned with military 
glory than with strategy, the Duce had grandiose dreams of concluest that 
were too expansive to be overly concerned with the small thom in the 
Sicilian Straits « Mussolini wanted an empire, not an Island. 
Such hopes did not seem unrealistic in 1939. With Germany as 
her partner, Italy was allied with a nation believed by many to be 
potentially the strongest power on the continent, a nation whose inter­
ests appeared to be no challenge to her own. Hitler expressed no 
territorial ambitions or special interests in the Mediterranean. 
Germany's attention was directed eastward, and althou^ the Western 
powers opposed German policy. Hitler's success at Munich seemed to open 
the way for further German aggression, 
Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939» Two days later, 
their ultimatums having expired, Britain and France declared war on 
Germany. Italy, unprepared for a major conflict, adopted a policy of 
non-belligerence, and the war temporarily remained a northern struggle. 
After the fall of Poland, the Wehrmacht paused until the spring 
^^The Italian Supreme Command. 
^^Eragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II. 19-20» 
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of 19^0, when Denmark, Norway, and. the Low Countries succumibed to the 
German Blitzkrieg. Allied forces could not stem the German tide, and by-
early June 1940 France was near total collapse. On 10 June 19^0 
Mussolini "belatedly joined his German ally, and the war "became an Axis 
effort. In making his decision, the Duce declared that Italy could not 
2X 
remain "gli eteml traditorl" (the eternal traitors). His strategy, 
however, sprang from the "belief that the war was nearly over and that a 
token effort could ^In Italy a seat at the peace ta'ble, and not from 
22 
his concern for fulfillment of the terms of the Axis alliance. 
To resist the expected Italian assault in June 19^0, Jfe-lta's 
defences consisted of five "battalions of Infantry (less than 4,000 
troops), four outdated aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, accidentally left 
"behind when the fleet evacuated the island, and 14 coastal anti-aircraft 
pb 
"batteries to defend more than 100 miles of shoreline, 
The lack of an adequate defensive capa"bility was not the only 
pro"blem that caused many British political and military leaders to 
consider the retention of the "base an impossible task. Because of its 
heavy population, the Island relied on imports to supplement it® produc­
tive capacity, which amounted to only 30 per cent of the required food­
stuffs and 50 per cent of the other essential requirements, such as 
fuel. At the time of Italy's entrance into the war, Malta's stockpile 
Belot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean. 5I, 
, W. Deakln, The Brutal Friendship. Mussolini. Hitler and the 
Fall of Italian Fascism (New York: IBfeirper & Row, I962), 11, Hereafter 
cited as Deakln, The Brutal Friendship. 
23cameron, Bed Duster. White Ensign. I7. 
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of supplies vas dangerously low. Only a few hundred tons of reserve 
food rations, stored in underground caches, were available to withstand 
ph 
a siege of the island. Althou^ the strategic situation of Jfelta 
prompted plans to abandon the central Mediterranean, Winston Churchill, 
after taking office as Prime Minister, expressed his de termination to 
hold Malta at all costs 
This, then, was Malta's strategic situation when the war in the 
Mediterranean "began in the summer of 19^0. Britain, although faced with 
the threat of imminent German invasion of the home islands, decided to 
reinforce her central Mediterranean fortress, Italy entered the war 
with no predetermined plans for the capture of Jfelta, and relied on the 
efforts of the Italian Air Force to neutralize the threat of British 
employment of the island as an offensive air and naval station, 
Mussolini based Italian strategy on his conviction that the success of 
the Wehrmacht would bring the war to a speedy conclusion. 
For Germany, the Italian declaration of war against Britain and 
France opened a possible new theater of operations. On the threshold of 
complete victory, however. Hitler disregarded the possibilities of a 
Mediterranean front for Germany, and chose instead the alternative--a 
direct cross-channel confrontation with Britain, The Mediterranean, 
Hitler decided, was of little consequence to a successful termination of 
the war, and the area became an Italian theater of operations with 
Pk 
Cameron, Bed Duster. White Ensign. I5, 
^^ChurchiU, Their Finest Hour. 428, 430, Churchill became Prime 
Minister in b&y I940, 
^^eakin. The Brutal Friendship. 11, 
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limiteà German technical assistance. The error of this decision "became 
apparent with the British victory in the Battle of Britain, the prolon­
gation of the war, and the Italian failure to achieve any success in the 
Mediterranean. Indeed, it was the failure of the Italian war effort 
that finally forced German intervention in the Mediterranean war. 
The Intervention of the Wehrmacht, however, was limited to the 
immediate goal of preventing an Italian collapse. Hitler remained 
peculiarly blind to the political and military consequences of a British 
defeat in the Mediterranean; hence, the German Supreme Command developed 
27 
no long range policy concerning the Mediterranean theater of operations « 
Based on limited objectives, German strategy in the Mediterranean, 
therefore, was unplanned, uncoordinated, sporadic, and conditional on 
developments elsewhere. The failure of this strategy is particularly 
noticeable concerning German policy toward Malta. 
^"^Anthony Martlenssen, Hitler and His Admirals (London: Seeker 
and Warburg, 1948), 123-24. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MEDITEBEA10IAIÎ KRIEGSSCHAUPIATZ^ 
The German decision to leave the Mediterranean theater of war to 
Italy originated in prewar diplomatic negotiations. Hitler had informed 
Mussolini in September 1936 that he regarded the Mediterranean as an 
Italian sea and would give free rein to the Duce's ambitions in the 
2 
area. As no German Interests were involved in the south. Hitler could 
afford to he generous. The Fuehrer had also realized that the possihil-
ity of acq_uiring British and French Mediterranean colonies was an 
attractive lure for Italian and Spanish cooperation with Germany in 
challenging the Western powers. 
Italy tied her ambitions to Germany in the "Pact of Steel," an 
offensive and defensive alliance concluded on 22 May 1939»^ After 
Britain and France declared war on Germany in September, the terms of 
the pact obliged Italy to Join her German ally. However, her complete 
unpreparedness for any major conflict forced her to renege on the 
4rhe word "Krlegsschauplatz." theater of operations, is used 
here to indicate that this chapter is primarily directed from the German 
view. 
^Conversation between the Duce and Herr Frank, 23 September 1936, 
Malcolm îfcggeridge, éd., Clano's Diplomatic Papers, trans, by Stuart 
Hood (Long Acre, London: Odhams Press Limited, 19^8), 43-48. 
^eakln. The Brutal Friendship. 5-6, 
agreement.^ Mussolini's decision had little effect on German military-
strategy; indeed^ the Italian alliance often appeared to the German 
Supreme Command as more of a handicap than an advantage. Hitler 
expected Italy to enter the war only in the event of great German 
successes. The alliance, then, would "be of no significant advantage to 
Germany if, as expected, Italy's need of war supplies proved a drain on 
the Beich.^ 
Other problems created by the Axis pact were more immediate. A 
successful combined war effort demanded mutual trust and cooperation. 
The Axis pact included neither. The Duce had no intention of entering 
the conflict to achieve only German war aims, while Germany distrusted 
the validity of total Italian commitment to an Axis victory. This 
distrust was instrumental in discouraging joint military conferences on 
the operational level, and such meetings as were arranged involved 
little more than an exchange of information on technical matters and 
questions of training. The Axis powers reached no agreement on basic 
strategic policy.^ 
The Axis alliance was also more of a personal agreement "between 
Hitler and Mi^solini than a pact "between the two nations. Only the Duce 
^eakin. The Brutal Friendship. 8. Mussolini informed Hitler 
one week after the pact was signed that Italy could not fulfill the 
terras of the alliance until her war preparations were completed. This 
is generally known as the Cavallero Memorandum. 
^Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy. 
1919-1945. 26 January IQ^i-O. 4. Hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences. 
^"berhard Weichold, Axis Naval Policy and Operations in the 
Mediterranean 1919 to May 194S (Office of Naval Intelligence. TJ,S,Navy 
Department, May I95I), 1-2, Hereafter cited as Weichold, Axis Naval 
Policy. 
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7 
could guarantee Italian commitment to the Axis, The maintenance of his 
personal prestige as a war leader, therefore, "became a German concern, 
and at times interfered with the freedom of German military planning. 
Such an instance occurred in early 1940 when Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, 
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, recommended to the Fuehrer that 
he extend submarine warfare to the Mediterranean. Hitler refused; he 
did not want to jeopardize the Axis pact by obvious German encroachment 
O 
in what the Duce considered "mare nostrum. " In such a manner political 
considerations outwei^ed military strategy. 
Both sides recognized the alliance as an unequal agreement, with 
Mussolini as the junior partner in the enterprise.^ Thus, to increase 
Italian prestige and to stress Italy's role in the final victory, the 
Duce devised the concept of "parallel war," This policy meant that the 
Axis powers would fight the war against the Allies separately, each in 
its own area. Hitler in the north and Mussolini in the south would set 
the pace and accept responsibility for the leadership of operations 
As the Fuehrer consistently underrated the importance of the Mediterran­
ean, this concept fitted in weU with German strategy. The dictum "Qiat 
the Alps separated the theaters of operations seemed a convenient excuse 
^Bernhard von Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab. Bericht elnes 
Generalsstabsoffiziers (Hamburg: H. H. Nolke, I95O), 95, Hereafter 
cited as Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab. 
fuehrer Conferences. 23 February 19^0, 13-14, 
%vone Eirkpatrick, tkssollnl. A Study in Power (New York: 
Hawthorn Books, Inc„, 1964), 46$. Hereafter cited as Kirkpatrick, 
Mussolini. 
^^ossberg, Tm WfiVirînachtfuehrungsstab. 95* 
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to avoid the combined war planning which neither side desired,^ 
%e Mediterranean caiiç>aign began on 10 June 19^0 with a weak and 
ineffectual assault by the Italian Army against an almost defeated 
France. No long term action was undertaken or planned. The Fuehrer 
expected Italy's entrance into the war, which Mussolini had insisted 
could not be delayed, to begin with a carefully planned and executed 
12 
operation against Malta or some other point of strategic importance. 
Instead, the Duce offered to Germany several idle Italian Air Force 
units for participation in the Battle of Britain, Hitler politely 
refused, suggesting that Italy undertake some action against Britain in 
the Mediterranean 
With the exit of France as a belligerent, the only hostile 
territory In the central Mediterranean was the island of Malta. Because 
of its strategic ingportance, both Britain and Germany expected the 
Italian General Staff to undertake an immediate and vigorous assault on 
the island In the first days of the war. Commando Supremo, however, 
limited its operations to a few sporadic air raids. In the summer of 
19^0 Mussolini considered the war nearly over, a British defeat inevi­
table, and the capture of Malta therefore superfluous. The suspension 
of British merchant shipping in the central Mediterranean convinced the 
Duce that Britain intended to abandon the area. He completely misjudged 
^^Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab. 95 • 
^^Kirkpatrick, Mussolini. 465-66. 
l^Mussollni to Hitler, 26 June 19^0, and Hitler to Mussolini, 13 
July 1940. Documents on Germn Foreign Policy. Ser. D: The War Years. 
Vol. 2, Doc. Nos, 126 and 166| 27 and 209-11. The offer was accepted, 
however, in October 1940. 
-18-
the si tuation. 
The failure to capture Malta, was one of the major Italian 
•blunders of the war. Without air support and with its forces severely-
reduced for home defense, the British Mediterranean fleet could not 
successfully have challenged an invasion of the island. Britain 
defended her Medlterranean fortress with three aircraft, significantly 
named Faith, Hope, and Charity.^5 jt was apparent that Britain intended 
to hold Malta when on 2 August air reinforcements arrived from Gibraltar. 
In the first summer of the Mediterranean war, the German Supreme 
Command concentrated on the Battle of Britain and preparations for 
Operation Sea Lion, and attached little importance to the failures of 
Italian planning. Whether Malta was taken or not hardly justified the 
attention of the Wehrmacht, Only the naval staff held a "southern 
outlook" and consistently presented the possibilities of German inter­
vention in the Mediterranean, But as supreme war commander. Hitler held 
the final decision for the conduct of the war, and he preferred to 
Ignore the Mediterranean as a German theater of operations. 
Hitler recognized the existence of three theaters of war in the 
summer of 19!^0. The first was the area around Britain from Trondhelm-
Stavanger in the north to the Gironde estuary in the south. The second 
^^ice Admiral Friedrich Euge, Per Seekrieg. trans, "by Commander 
M„ G. Saunders (Annapolis, Md«, : U«8. Naval Institute, I957), I30, 
^^Cameron, Bed Duster. White Ensign. 4$. These names were 
assigned by the Maltese people to Britain's three alrci%ft. Originally 
there were four Swordfish filters available. One crashed before the 
Mediterranean war began and was cannibalized for spare parts. 
^^eichold. Axis Naval Policy. 10» 
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was the submarine combat area In the Atlantic, And the third was the 
Mediterranean, He had no desire to assume control of the southern 
l7 
theater, in spite of the arguments of his naval advisers, ' 
A principal advocate of extending German operations to the 
Xfi 
Mediterranean was Admiral Welchold. As head of the German Naval 
Liaison Staff in Home, Welchold repeatedly advised his superiors that 
the outcome of the Mediterranean war was as much a German concern as an 
Italian one. He particularly emphasized the importance of capturing 
Jfelta, which, as an aerial reconnaissance station, jeopardized the 
activities of the Italian Navy in protecting Its communications with 
Libya: 
Under these circumstances, the elimination of Malta as a British 
naval and air base bee canes ingéra tlve. Going by present experiences 
this task cannot be left to the Italian air force alone. Moreover, 
the use of naval forces Is essential if a combined attempt to seize 
the island is to be made«^9 
Welchold suggested the transfer of German forces to support a 
full scale Italian assault, which included mlnelaying in the Sicilian 
Straits, air attacks on the island's defenses, and finally a landing 
20 
operation. The admiral's report received little attention at 0,K.W, 
^^Conversation between Hitler and Ciano, 8 July 19^0. Docnmmnta 
on Gft-rman Forelpgi Policv. Ser, D, X, Doc. No, 129; 1^9. 
l&Vlce Admiral Eberhard Welchold was the German Naval Liaison 
Officer in Borne from June 19^0 to March 1943. After November 19^1 he 
was also In command of all German naval forces operating in the Mediter­
ranean, 
^%elchold. The War at Sea in the Mediterranean (Office of Naval 
Intelligence, "U.S. Navy Department, n.d,), 13. Hereafter cited as 
Welchold, The War at Sea. 
^%elchold. Axis Naval Policy. 12. 
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headquarters, as the proposed moveiuent of German forces to the Mediter­
ranean implied a major shift in strategy—an action which could "be 
approved only by the Fuehrer, 
In September ip%0 Admiral Eaeder recommended to Hitler that he 
taransfer the main German war effort to the Mediterranean, as an alterna­
tive to Operation Sea Lion, The capture of Suez and Gibraltar, Eaeder 
argued, could be of decisive importance to the defeat of Britain, By 
securing the Mediterranean, the Axis powers could assure themselves of 
unlimited raw materials and could gain new bases in the Near East for 
further operations against the British Empire. But to guarantee success 
Germany should assume operational control of the southern theater, in 
spite of expected Italian objections. Eaeder added that the ineffective­
ness of Italian arms was obvious. Since she had not even attempted to 
capture îfelta, Italy could hardly be expected to take the Suez Canal 
PI 
without German support, 
Eaeder also emphasized the political conseq^uences of a British 
defeat in the Mediterranean, Turkey would fall under German influence, 
Spain would enter the war, and the Soviet IMion's aggressive tendency, 
as evidenced by her actions against Finland and Eomanla, would be dis-
PP 
suaded by the presence of a large German force on her southern flank. 
Hitler generally agreed with Eaeder's comments, but he had other 
ideas regarding the extension of the war. He believed that Britain 
continued the war only in the hope of intervention by another power. In 
^^Fuehrer Conferences. 7 September 19^0, 19-25. 
^^Ibid. 
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considering this possibility, the Fuehrer believed that the United 
States would not enter the war and that even if she did, it would he too 
late to threaten Germany's European hegemony. The only threat to German 
domination of Europe, then, and Britain's last hope, was the Soviet 
Union, By the fall of 1^40 Hitler planned on Operation Barbarossa, the 
invasion of Russia, to end the war. The Fuehrer considered the Mediter­
ranean an ancillary theater, useful in tying down British forces but not 
strategically Important in determining final victory. Hitler's conti­
nental strategy changed, however, by the fall of 19^0, when the Italian 
Army's defeats in North Africa and Greece threatened the collapse of his 
Axis partner and required immediate German ald«^^ 
On 13 September 19^0 Italy began her long-awaited offensive 
against Egypt, After brief success, supply problems and stiff British 
0]i 
resistance halted ihe Italian advance at Sldi Barranl, Mussolini, 
rather than attempt to reinforce the North African campaign, undertook 
on 28 October the conquest of Greece, This invasion, which endangered 
German continental strategy, was a fiasco, and the Greeks' counterattack 
succeeded in repelling the invader with heavy losses. 
Hitler was extremely displeased with Mussolini's Greek escapade, 
especially since the Duce had not informed him of the operation until 
after it had begun.German leaders saw no military reason for 
extending the war Into the Balkans, On the contrary, a Balkan front 
23Martienssen, Hitler and His Aamlrals. 123-2k, 
oh 
Belot, The Strupy^le for the Mediterranean. 73. 
^5ibid.. 77, 
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threatened. the preparatioiis for Barbarossa# If Mussolini wanted a new 
area for operations, they asked, why had Italy not attacked Jfelta, where 
of. 
Axis interests were obviously concemed? 
The Duce's decision was not "based on military considerations» 
Jtissolini sought a prestige victory to compensate for Italian defeats in 
East Africa and Cyrenaica. He saw no great glory in capturing a small 
island on Italy's own doorstep. Moreover, the Duce considered the 
capture of Malta a hazardous task which would involve specialized 
eq.uipment and training. Germany could provide Ihe tactical air support 
necessary for an amphibious operation. Taut Mussolini wanted no German 
Intervention in the Italian theater of war. He "believed that once the 
Germans arrived, they would never leave.Gemmny, however, had no 
desire to intervene. Althou^ Genmn advisers in Eome consistently 
recommmded the Wehrmacht's cooperation in capturing Ifelta, Hitler was 
unwilling to commit Luftwaffe units to the Mediterraneaa. The Italian 
debacle in Greece changed the strategic outlook for the Axis. Missolinl 
reluctantly req_uested Germn aid and Hitler entered the Mediterranean 
war to prevent an Italian collapse, 
Germany limited her commitment to the Mediterranean theater at 
first to the transfer of Fliegerkorps X, a veteran air group of #ie 
Norwegian campai@a that was well trained in operations at sea against 
enemy shipping. The first unit, a German transport squadron, arrived at 
^^Adolf Heusinger, Hitler et 1*0„K.H. (Paris: Editions Berger= 
Levrault, 1952), 66; and Walter Gorlltz, ed,. The Mem)Irs of Field 
Marshal Keltel. trans, by David Irving (New York: Stein and Day, I966), 
127, Hereafter cited as Gorlltz, ed.. Eeltel. 
^%elot. The Struggle for the Mediterranean. 93» 
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Foggia Air Base in late October, and by ferrying troops and supplies 
from Italy to Albania, played an important part in halting the Greek 
28 
offensive. The remaining units of Fliegerkorps X arrived in early 
December. Field Marshal Milch, Inspector-General of the Luftwaffe, 
informed Mussolini that by the Fuehrer's order the Fliegerkorps could 
not participate directly In the Greek campaign. Its primary objectives 
were to secure the Libyan convoy route and, In particular, to neutralize 
the island of Êfeilta by air attack. 
Hitler's order recognized that Britain, not Greece, remained liie 
major enemy in the Mediterranean. The Fuehrer believed it was vital to 
stop the British advance in North Africa, which threatened to capture 
all of Libya,The British, If they gained control of Tripolitania, 
could secure the passage of the central îfedlterranean for British 
merchant and naval ships and establish Libya as a base for major air 
attacks on Sicily and southern Italy. Even more important, if tfelta 
were well supplied and operationally capable, the British could extend 
their attack into the heartland of Italy and use the island as a staging 
base for the invasion of the continent itself. 
German strategy in the Mediterranean at the end of 19^0 was thus 
Report No. A-578, "The German Air Force in Italy," 12 July 
19^5 (unpublished, USAF Eecords Center^ Maxwell AFB), 1. The transport 
group's activities never violated Greek territory. 
^^Conversation between Field Marshal Milch and the Duce, 11 
December I9ÎJ-O, Documents on German Foreign Policy. Ser. D, XI, Doc. 
ksk; 8^4!*-. Milch was Inspector-General of the Luftwaffe and Ministerial 
Secretary (Staatssekretaer) of -tiae Air Ministry. 
^®The Italian offensive In North Africa halted at Sldl Bar rani 
on 16 September 1940. Britain launched her counteroffensIve on 9 
December 19^0, and in a few weeks recaptured all of Cyrenalca. 
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concentrated on sectiriîig the central Jfediteiranean for Axis convoys and 
eliminating Malta as an enemy "base by air attack. Hitler did not take 
into accotint the opportunities for total Axis victory in the area but 
limited German intervention to preventing an Italian defeat. His 
eiriploynient of the Wehrmacht in the Mediterranean was no more than a 
holding action of limited scope, direction, and duration. 
Hitler assigned Fliegerkorps X on a temporary basis. The 
Fuehrer intended to withdraw it for use elsewhere at the beginning of 
February 19^1, by which time, he believed, its mission would be accom­
plished.^^ The Luftwaffe force in Italy was organized as a special 
command under the direct orders of Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief Hermann 
Goering and subordinate only to tfcissolini in the Italian chain of 
command. Its operations, therefore, were under Genmn direction with 
little Italian control, 
Along with the Luftwaffe went the Fuehrer's advice for its 
employment. Hitler advocated employing the same tactics used by the 
Luftwaffe over Britain—the continuous bombing of the same target for a 
long period of time--against Malta and British Mediterranean shipping. 
Based on the Douhet theory. Hitler believed such a strategy would 
cause Britain to abandon Malta and to suspend maritime traffic in the 
^^Hitler to Mussolini, 5 December 19^0. Documents on Germn 
Foreign Policy. Ser, D, XI, Doc. Wo. 789. 
^%eichold, Axis Naval Policy. 23, 
^^Giulio Douhet was one of the first prophets of the use of 
terror bombing in warfare. As early as I909 he warned of the potential­
ities of air power, particularly the psychological effect of continuous 
mass bombing on the civilian population. 
central Mediterranean,^^ 
The force assembled for Operation Mlttelmeerj, the codename for 
the assignment of the Luftwaffe to the Mediterranean^ had a formidable 
appearance. Under the command of General Hans-Ferdinand Geisler and 
Chief of Staff Colonel Harlinghaiisen, Fliegerkorps X occupied "bases in 
southern Italy and Sicily at Catania, GerMni^ Comiso, Castel^ Vetrano, 
and Trapani, In January 19^1 the air corps comprised 186 aircraft^ 
including two bomber groups^ one dive bomber group^ and two fighter 
groups. Auxiliary units included a reconnaissance and minelaying squad­
ron and related ground organization,% oppose this force, the best 
that Ifelta could muster at the end of 1^40 was approximately 4^ opera­
tional aircraft. 
The Luftwaffe launched its first attack on 10 January 1^41 
against a British convoy bound for Malta, It achieved notable success 
and severely damaged the aircraft carrier Illustrious, which managed to 
escape to Malta,On l6 January Wfeilta underwent its first aassive air 
raid. Approximately 60 dive bombers concentrated on the dockyard, 
particularly the crippled Illustrious. but damage was minor. Two days 
later the Luftwaffe turned its attention to îfe.lta's airfields in an 
attempt to eliminate the British challenge in the skies above the 
^^Conversation between Hitler and Mussolini, 19 January 19^1. 
Documents on German Foreign Policy. Ser. D, XI, Doc, No, 672J 1130» 
35Eeport No, A-578, "The Geiman Air Force in Italy," 2, 
^^Macintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean. 44, 
^^S. W, Eoskill, The War at Sea, Vol, II: The Period of Balance 
(London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office, I956), 421, 
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island-o^® The primary targets were the airfields at Luq,a and Hal Far» 
In smrprise raidsj, the Luftwaffe destroyed a number of aircraft on the 
ground^ and its constant "bombing inflicted considerable damage on the 
runways and supply depots» At one time the island's defenders had no 
more than six operational aircraftThe Illustrious managed to escape 
on 23 January^ Tmt Malta's trial had only "begun„ 
The total attacking force at the end of January numbered 212 
"bombers. The island's defenders, accustomed to the ineffective and 
occasional sorties of the Eegia Aeronautica, found the Luftwaffe attack 
of a different nature. Launched with great skill and daring "by veterans 
of aerial warfare, the air raids hammered Incessantly at the island's 
defenses. Docking facilities were destroyed^ and su"bmarines were forced 
to remain submerged during the day and surface for repairs only at night» 
British Swordfish and outdated Gladiator aircraft were no match for tiie 
ME-109So^^ Only the Hurricanes could challenge the aerial supremacy of 
t h e  L u f t w a f f e ,  a n d  t h e r e  w e r e  f e w  a v a i l a " b l e  f o r  M a l t a ' s  d e f e n s e A n t i ­
aircraft "batteries accounted for some German losses, but not enough to 
3®}fecintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean, 53o 
39itid. 
^OSwordfish were single engine biplanes used as torpedo bombers 
or fighters with a maximum speed of I39 m.p.h, and a range of 528 miles. 
Gladiators were single engine biplanes used as fighters with a maximum 
speed of 2^5 m.p,h. and a range of 523 miles, ME-I09S were twin engine 
monoplane fighters with a maximum speed of 395 m,poh« and a range of 650 
miles. 
^^EoskiU, The War at Sea. II, 400» Fifteen Hurricanes were 
based on îfelta on I5 January 1941, These aircraft were single engine 
monoplanes used as fighters with a maximum speed of 342 m,p,h, and a 
range of 97O miles with auxiliary tanks. 
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ko 
deter the attackers» 
In February^ however^ the Luftwaffe slackened its assault on 
Malta because of the transfer of some of its units to Libya to support 
the Italian Army, OoK.W. considered it necessary to prevent another 
Italian defeat and the loss of all of Cyrenaica, During February the 
Luftwaffe launched only two large scale raids on the island,In the 
question of priorities^ ifeilta consistently ranked a poor second in bo# 
German and Italian strategy. 
To strengthen further the Italian forces in North Africa, a 
German expeditionary force under the conmand of General Erwin Eommel 
followed the arrival of the Luftwaffe in North Africa, No British 
forces opposed the crossing from Sicily to Libyaj, as the presence of 
Fliegerkorps X dissuaded enemy intervention from MaltaThe arrival 
of Rommel's force, •which became known as the Afrlka Eorps, increased the 
need for cooperation between the Axis powers. 
Hitler outlined his views on the employment of the Afrlka Korps 
in a letter to Mussolini» He informed the Duce that the transfer of the 
German armored division presupposed that Italy intended to hold Tripoli-
tania and not, as the Duce had indicated, only the area around Œ^îpoli 
Itself 9 The Fuehrer believed that such a decision would make supply by 
sea impossible, render Ineffective the conduct of an air war^ and 
handicap an Axis offensive to re Wee Cyrenaica. Hitler also expressed 
^^ffeicintyre. The Battle for the ttediterranean. 53= 5^ • 
^%eichold. Axis Naval Policy, 26» 
^^Rosklll, The War at Sea. II, 424-2$. 
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concern over sea communications "between Italy and Libya, adding, "I 
consider it likewise indispensable to destroy completely the British air 
and naval base at Jfelta," Hitler added that 0,K»W. was studying plans 
for such an operation at the present time and that he would mke avail» 
able further Luftwaffe forces if necessary to insure success 
The formation of the Afrika Korps and the Fuehrer's pronounce­
ment on Jfelta seemed to Indicate that Hitler now recognized the Impor­
tance of the Mediterranean theater and was willing to accept a major 
role In the area. But Hitler had no such intention^ On the same day 
that he had authorized the Afrlka Korps to O.K.W,, the Fuehrer informed 
Admiral Eaeder that Germany's position in Europe was so firmly estab­
lished that even the loss of aU of North Africa would not be to her 
disadvantage 
Hitler was no doubt overstating the situation. He realized the 
consequences of a British victory in the Mediterranean, if only because 
of the psychological and political repercussions « The renark^ however. 
Is indicative of Hitler's almost total lack of understanding of the 
strategic importance of the Mediterranean war as related to the final 
outcome o His views on the inçortance of Malta and North Africa, as 
expressed to Mussolini, were designed for Italian consumption only. 
Between the Battle of Britain and the commencemaat of Barbarossa, 
Germany could afford the connni'tanent of limited forces to the Mediterran­
ean for political reasons, if for no other. Hitler expected a rapid 
^5gltler to Mussolini, 5 February 1941. Documents on German 
Foreign Policy. Ser. D, XII, Doc. No. 17J 29. 
^^uehrer Conferences. 9 January 19^1, 4. 
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termination of the Luftwaffe assigmnent against Malta before its 
transfer for duty elsewhere « 
General Eommel and Admiral Eaeder, among others, opposed 
Hitler's policy re^rding Malta. They realized that the success of 
German strategy--based on neutralization by air attack rather than a 
landed invasion—depended on constant bombing of the island» If the 
Luftwaffe raids ended before achieving complete neutralization^ they 
argued, Malta's defenders needed only supplies to regain an offensive 
capability which could threaten the supply route of the newly arrived 
German Panzer division. 
The naval staff again took the lead in proposing a final 
solution to the problem» On 18 îfexch 19*^1 Admiral Eaeder urged Hitler 
to consider the capture of Jfelta, He argued that Axis control of the 
island could simplify supplying the Afrika Korps» Moreover, rather than 
being used for escort purposes, Italian naval ships would be freed for 
operational uses against the British fleet» The naval chief added that 
the Luftwaffe supported his proposal and had already acknowledged the 
possibility of capturing the island with airborne troops» Hitler 
replied that the possibility was under consideration»^^ 
Goering had no intention, however, of committing Luftwaffe 
forces to such an undertaking» The Reichsmarschal informed the Fuehrer 
that such an operation appeared more difficult than anticipated because 
the island's termin, divided by numerous small walls, would make it 
^"^Fuehrer Conferences. 18 îferch 19^1, 30. 
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dlfficult for airborne troops to operate,^® The possiMlities of a 
seaborne Invasion received no consideration by the Supreme Command, 
General Pommel also requested in the spring of 19^1 that O.K.W, 
solve the supply problem of the Afrika Kbrps by capturing Malta, When 
O.K.W, informed him that no forces were available for such an operation, 
he offered to take the island with his own troops, but the Supreme 
Command refused his request. The safety of the Libyan convoy route 
remained dependent on the success of the Luftwaffe air attack on ̂ Ita. 
In March 19^1 Fliegerkorps X returned to large scale raids over 
Jfelta, The January attack had nearly neutralized the Islandj the March 
raids promised to finish the job. Wo large convoy reached the island 
after the arrival of the Luftwaffe, forcing the British defenders to 
ration their diminishing supplies. By the end of March the Luftwaffe 
dominated the skies; the Libyan convoy route was nearly secured, 
Germany lost her attempt to achieve total neutralization of 
Malta, however, when the Wehrmacht launched Operation Marl ta, the 
invasion of the Balkans To support Marl ta. Hitler transferred the 
majority of Fliegerkorps X from the central Mediterranean to support the 
Greek campaign, and thus ended the pressure of the constant German air 
raids on Malta just as the Luftwaffe neared final victory. 
The German forces that swept into Greece in April 19^1 forced 
^%'uehrer Conferences. 18 March 194-1, 30, Eaeder's statement of 
Luftwaffe support for an airborne assault probably came from Luftwaffe 
Chief of Staff Hans Jeschonnek, who favored capture of the island and 
was a firm advocate of interservice cooperation, 
^^1 tier's War Directive No. 20, 13 December 1940, Walther 
Hubatsch, ed.. Hitlers Welsun^en fur die Rrie^uehrung 1939-1945 
(Frankfurt am îfeln; Bernard & Graefe, 19^2), 81-83, 
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the British expeditionary force to evacuate to CreteDuring the 
Greek campaigi. Hitler asked Operations Section of O.E.W. to prepare a 
report indicating which occupation was more important for the future of 
Mediterranean strate®r, that of Crete or that of Malta. The members of 
the planning staff, including officers from the three services, without 
exception advocated the capture of MaltaField Marshal Wilhelm 
Keitel, Chief of 0,K,¥,, and Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, his Chief of 
Operations, concurred. Both men recognized that Ifelta was the greater 
strategic prize. The only objection came from the Luftwaffe: Goering 
favored Crete, and Hitler supported the Eeichsmarschal over the objec­
tions of his top Wehrmacht advisers 
Goering chose Crete because he considered it the easier of the 
two objectives for his Luftwaffe forces. As either operation would be 
entirely a Luftwaffe affair. Hitler gave special attention to Goering's 
argumentYet it was the Fuehrer who had to make the final decision, 
and he remained unconvinced of Malta's importance. Hitler believed that 
the capture of Crete would insure the safety of Germany's southeastern 
flank for the implementation of Barbarossa and prevent British bombers 
from attacking the Romanian oil fields at Ploesti.^^ 
^ORoskill, The War at Sea. II, 
5lwalter Warllmont, Ins ide Hi tier ' s Heada uarters. trans o by E. H, 
Barry (New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1S&^), 131, 
52Gorlitz, ed., Eeltel. 142. 
53ibld. 
5^Karl Gundelach, "The Battle for Crete, '* In Decisive Battles of 
World War II: The German View, ed. by H. A, Jacobsen and J, Eohwer, 
trans, by Edward Fitzgerald (New York: G. P. Putnam's Son®, I965), 99-132. 
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The capture of Crete at the end of May opened new opportunities 
for Germany to extend the Mediterranean war. General Eurt Student, the 
Commander of the airborne units at Crete, advocated a follow-up assault 
on Cyprus or Malta, and then perhaps a German attack on the Suez Canal 
itself«^5 But the extremely high casualties incurred in the Cretan 
operation^^ dissuaded the Fuehrer from further massive airtome opera­
tions o As Hitler explained to Student^ "Crete proved that the days of 
the parachute troops are over. The parachute arm is one which relies 
entirely on surprise. In the meantime the surprise factor has exhausted 
itself."^7 In any case. Hitler had no intention of extending his Medi­
terranean success, for in May 19^1 his attention remained focused east­
ward with preparations for the coming campaign against the Soviet Union, 
Germany transferred the remaining units of Fliegerkorps X to 
Crete and Greece on 22 May, This meant that the Italian Air Force alone 
had to continue to neutralize Malta and to secure the convoy route to 
Worth Africa for Axis shipping. From January to March 194-1--that is, 
during the period of the Luftwaffe attack--the Libyan convoys had had 
little difficulty in reaching their destination. During tiie summer of 
19^1, however, the efforts of the Begla Aeronautica proved no more 
successful in neutralizing Jfelta than they had "been the previous year. 
H, Liddell Hart, "Die German Generals Talk (New York: 
William Morrow & Co,, 19^8), l60-èl. Student commanded Fliegerkorps XI 
at Crete and was considered an expert in airborne operations. He later 
headed the planning for Operation Herkules, 
5^In the German invasion of Crete, the airborne forces had over 
6,000 casualties, which was about 25 per cent of the invading force. At 
the time, these figures were considered extremely hi^. 
^Toundelach, "The Battle for Crete," 131. 
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After the loss of Crete^ the British recognized that it was more impor­
tant thçui ever to hold Malta, and they immediately reinforced the 
58 
island. Increased British air and submarine operations from Malta 
accounted for the steady increase in the toll of Axis shipping losses on 
the North African convoy route» As the British increased Malta's offen­
sive strength, the amount of supplies arriving in Libyan ports decreasedc 
After June 19^1 Hitler and O.K,¥« were totally committed to the 
Eastern frontj no forces were left for the Mediterranean. Bommel's 
frequent communiques to Berlin concerning the supply problem were 
largely ignored. Until late in the year Malta and the war in the 
Mediterranean remined in the backwater of German strategy. 
5^n March 1941, just after the Luftwaffe was partially trans­
ferred for Marita, the first convoy arrived. Convoys thereafter faced 
decreasing opposition. By June nearly all damage had been repaired and 
the island was considered fully capable for offensive operations, 
59see Appendix A for chart of Axis shipping losses compared with 
total amount leaving Italian ports. 
CHAPTER III 
THE LUFTWAFFE MEUTRALIZES MALTA 
The concentration of German strength on the Eastern front had 
serious effects on the Mediterranean war» Hitler withdrew Fliegerkorps 
VIII and the major part of Fliegerkorps X for support of Operation 
Bartarossa. With their strength considerably reduced, the remaining 
Luftwaffe units could provide little support for the Afrika Korps and 
none for the Libyan convoy routeBased on Greece and Crete, Flieger­
korps X limited its activities to the eastern Mediterranean basin, where 
Hitler intended to maintain the Luftwaffe's offensive role by bombing 
Alexandria and aerial minelaying in the Suez Canal» Germany left the 
defensive assignment of suppressing Malta and protecting the convoy 
route to North Africa to the Eegia Aeronautica 
The departure of the Luftwaffe in May 1^41 from the central 
Mediterranean gave Britain the opportunity to repair Malta's defenses. 
Without massive Luftwaffe support the Italian Air Force could offer no 
serious challenge to the flow of reinforcements. Althou^ Italian air 
raids continued against the island, the arrival of British Hurricanes 
^Weichold, Axis Naval Policy. $0. The remaining units of 
Fliegerkorps X included eight bomber groups, three fighter groups, and 
five reconnaissance squadrons. 
^Report No. A-578, "The German Air Force in Italy," 2» 
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"bolstered Malta's defensive capabilities and the Eegia Aeronautica 
experienced decreasing success. By the summer of 19^1 the British again 
operated Malta as an air and submarine base against Axis shipping and 
Britain regained the initiative in the battle of supplies^ jeopardizing 
the Italo-German comtaltment in North Africa» 
The success of the Afrika Karps depended on the free flow of 
reinforcements and supplies from Italy to Libya o Eoramel launched his 
first desert offensive with Malta rendered impotent by the German Air 
Force, but after June hardly a convoy passed unchallenged and the 
supply situation for the Axis in North Africa steadily worsened. 
Shortages of fuel, ammunition, weapons, and equipment forced Eommel to 
appeal to 0,K<,W, for redress of the situation,^ The German Supreme 
Command, however, left the solution of the convoy problem to Italy, 
Although the Italian Navy in the summer of 19^1 was superior in 
numbers to the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, Italy was 
unable to achieve effective control of the central Mediterranean basin 
The air and submarine operations from t^lta accounted for the difference. 
When the Supreme Coraimnd transferred its Mediterranean air units from 
Sicily, Comimndo Supremo requested that a few Luftwaffe units remain^ 
^Ninety per cent of the cargo loaded for North Africa in February 
and tferch 19^1 arrived safely. On 1 April Rommel launched his campai^a. 
^Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers. 139. 
5a comparison of British and Italian naval forces in the Mediter­
ranean between June and September 19^0: Italy--five battleships, ttirse 
heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, 3^ destroyers, and k6 submarines; 
Britain-"three battleships, eight li^t cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 29 
submarines. The Italian battleships were also more modem than the Brit­
ish, while Italy's cruisers had greater firepower and speed than those of 
the Royal Navy. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. II, 338-39» 
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particularly a minelaying squadron, as such units were extremely effec­
tive in blocking Malta's ports « Hitler, however, could spare no forces 
for Jfelta after the inauguration of Barharossa,^ 
The ineffectiveness of the Italian effort in providing supplies 
for Lihya forced tfossolini, in July 19^1, to request another extension 
of Ctenmn aid. The Duce eiDphasized to Hitler that the solution of the 
supply problem was an Axis rather than an Italian concern. Hitler 
offered encouragement and advice to the Duce, but not military forces. 
The Fuehrer cited immobilization of Malta as an important goal of 
Italian strategy for the success of future Axis operations, but for the 
present Germany was totally committed to the Eastern offensive.^ 
Hitler also offered his advice on solving the chronic problem of 
transporting supplies to North Africa. His proposal to the Duce was to 
reroute the Axis convoys to Libya via Greece and Crete, avoiding the 
ft 
Sicilian Straits and bypassing Malta. The Fuehrer's plan, however, 
failed to consider the entire strategic situation and to take into 
account the wore basic problems which handicapped Genmny's Axis partner 
in supplying the Axis forces in North Africa. 
The first problem was shipping, Italy had entered the war with 
a large proportion of her merchant fleet in foreign ports outside the 
Mediterranean, which oversight caused a serious loss of cargo space for 
^eichold. Axis Naval Policy. 5l„ 
'^Hitler to Mussolini, 20 July 19^1, and Mussolini to Hitler, 26 
July 1941. PociiTOftnts on German Foreign Policy. Ser. D, XIII, Doc. Nos. 
134 and 156J 190=95 and 221. 
%bid. 
-37" 
convoy duty to North Africa.^ Another problem was fuel oil» Germany 
had promised to make up this deficiency when Italy entered the war, "but 
the needs of the Wehrmacht left little for the Italian armed forces. 
The long, roundabout route to Tripoli via Crete meant a considerable 
increase in fuel consumption, which Italy could ill afford, and also 
exposed the convoys and their escorts to attack for longer periods of 
timeThe crux of the problem was that Malta could not be bypassed 
because of its position as a watchtower over the Italian routes» 
Malta's reconnaissance aircraft immediately sighted Italian 
convoys passing ihrou^i ttie Straits of Messina. Surface ships based at 
Alexandria, informed of the convoys' course and speed, had little 
difficulty in intercepting, and British submarines from Malta prowled 
the convoy area with increasing success 
Hitler considered the Cretan route the more natural supply line 
to North Africa. The Fuehrer advocated use of the Cyrenaican ports of 
Benghazi and Dema rather than Tripoli, but again German strategy did 
not appreciate the situation. Only at Tripoli were there proper facili­
ties for handling cargo, storage, and transportation to the front. 
After repeated British attecks, the port of Benghazi was inadeg_uate--
docks were destroyed and the harbor littered with half-sunken ships. At 
De ma there was a lack of native manpower to unload the ships. Throughout 
%elot. The War In the Mediterranean. 10. When Italy went to 
war, 218 ships of approximately 1,200,000 tons remained abroad. This 
amounted to nearly one-third of the merchant fleet and also were some of 
Italy's most modem ships. 
^%uge, Der Seekrlea. 249. 
^^Ibid. 
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the war^ much to Eommel's disappointment, Tripoli was to remain the 
12 
major port for Axis supplies. 
German encouragement and advice to her Axis partner did not 
alleviate the situation. Commando Supremo informed O.K.W, in July 19^1 
that due to increased shipping losses, Italy could no longer adequately 
supply the Italo-German forces in North Africa, The Italian General 
Staff considered the Cretan route inoperable without air support. The 
source of the supply protlem, they declared, came from the inability to 
secure the primary route across the Sicilian Straits to Tripoli, and 
until this situation was corrected, they advised that Eommel alsandon the 
siege of Tobruk and retreat to defensive positions within Libya. 
Eommel did not agree with Commando Supremo's judgment that ttie 
supply problem was unsolvable, and he intended to maintain the offensive 
posture of the Afrika Korps, While he criticized the reluctance of the 
Italian Navy to provide adequate escort, Eommel believed that the 
primary responsibility for relieving the supply situation belonged to 
0,Ko¥. The Commander of the Afrika Kbrps urged Hitler to consider the 
retam of the Luftwaffe and the elimination of îfelta as an enemy base 
rather than the alternative--the loss of all of North Afrioa,^^ 
Hitler's concern, however, was with the Eastern front and the Battle of 
^^Liddell Hart, The Eommel Papers. 138. Eommel required, in the 
summer of 1^41, 1,500 tons of supplies, including water, to reach the 
front each day just to maintain his position. 
^%elchold. Axis Naval Policy. 5I. 
^^Liddell Hart, The Sommai Parmra. 191. 
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Moscow rather than with Noriii Africa and the siege of Tobrok»^^ 
By the fall of 19%1 the Afrlka Kbrps* offensive capability was 
severely reduced due to the lack of supplies. In August British forces 
sank 35 per cent of Roramsl's supplies j in September the toll reached 
nearly 40 per cent Because of the rapidly deteriorating situation on 
the Worth African front^, Hitler reluctantly recognized that the Jfediter= 
ranean front would not wait for the conclusion of Barbarossa» 
On 14 September 19^1 Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe forces in the 
eastern ffediterranean to accept responsibility for the safe conduct of 
Axis convoys o This meant the redirection of Fliegerkorps X to a defen­
sive rather ttian an offensive mission» Qoering opposed the ordero The 
Beichsmarschal argued that protection of the central Mediterranean meant 
the transfer of a major part of Fliegerkorps X to Sicilian air bases 
which the Italian Air Force had already reoccupied. Withdrawal from the 
eastern basin^ Goering stated^ meant that the Luftwaffe would be unable 
17 
to support the Afrika Kbrps in its drive to Suez» ' 
Goering's argument surprised General Rommslo As its asslgament 
was against Suez arai Alexandria, Fliegerkorps X provided little direct 
assistance to the Afrika Korps In Cyrenaica, and Eommel'e advance 
depended upon the solution of the supply problem. It appears that 
Goering had other reasons for opposing the Fuehrer's directive» The 
^^ommal reached the defensive perimeters of Tobruk on 4 May 
19^1 and thereafter maintained a limited siege of the fortress until 10 
December 1941, 
^^eichoM, Axis Haval Policy. $6, 
^7lbld.. 55o 
Eeichamarschal had no wish to return to the attack on Ifelta with only 
one reduced air mit, and as there was no gLorj to "be won in the skies 
over Malta, Goering wanted the Luftwaffe in position to participate in 
the capttire of Suez. He had no intention of "being left out of such a 
prestigious operation. 
During the desert canç)algn in 1942, Eommel wrote that Goering 
continually interfered in the strategic planning for the Mediterraaean 
theater, expecting that easy victories would "be won in the area» He was 
concerned, Rommsl wrote, only in advancing his own prestige and winning 
laurels for the Luftwaffe.^® Beset "by the problems of in ter-Axis and 
interservice quarreling, Rommel considered Goering his worst enemy 
The Eeichsmarschal's opposition to the Fuehrer's order increased the 
bitterness between the Commnder of the Afrika Korps and the Luftwaffe 
Commander- in- Chief » 
Goering successfully evaded Hitler's order and the Luftwaffe 
limited the German air cover to the area from Greece to Cyrenaica and 
along the coast to Dema and Benghazi, leaving the main convoy route 
from Italy to Tripoli and Tripoli to Benghazi unpro tec ted.Absorbed 
with the Russian campaign, Hitler offered no objection to the limita­
tions imposed on his original order. 
Goering°s effrontery, however, did not go unnoticed» The naval 
staff objected adamantly to -Qie Luftwaffe's evasion of the Supreme 
^^Liddell Hart, Thm Rommel Papers. 366-67. 
^9iMd.. 367. 
^(Veichold, Axis Kaval Policy» 55. 
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CommaBâ directive » From Borne Admiral WeichoM urged the en^loyment of 
Fliegerkorps X in full strength against Malta, and the increase in 
British attacks from the British fortress on Italian ports and supply-
ships reinforced the Navy's argument. The German Naval Staff warned 
O.K.W, on 20 September; 
Iftiless the operational orders of X Fliegerkorps are modified to 
conform with the original directives of the Supreme Command, or 
reinforcements are sent forthwith (preferably to Sicily), regardless 
of weakening the Russiein front, it will he too late to do anything,21 
Admiral Raeder continued the argument with Hitler. He advised 
the Fuehrer that since the Italian air and naval forces alone could not 
provide adequate escort, Germany would again have to take responsibility 
for the leadership of operations in the Mediterranean. Eaeder urged 
that all political and military measures to improve the convoy situation 
"be undertaken immediately « Hitler remained reluctant to reinforce the 
Msdi terranean front, "but he approved the transfer of six U-boats to the 
area, over the objections of Admiral Doenitz,^^ The Fuehrer made no 
change in the Luftwaffe assignment. Fliegerkorps X continued to operate 
from Greece and Crete, but protection of the "back door" route proved 
ineffective in solving the supply problem. Lack of close cooperation 
between the Italian Navy and the Luftwaffe added to the problem. The 
planned rendezvous off Greece of Italian convoy ships and German air 
cover often did not occur, forcing the ships to proceed without air 
^%eichold. Axis Naval Policy. 55. 
^%\iehrer Conferences. I7 September 19^1, 4?. 
35-36, 
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support and resulting in increased convoy losses» Only one-third of 
the troops and one-seventh of the supplies required by the Afrika Eorps 
arrived in Libya during September. 
Britain, meannrhile, continued to extend Malta's offensive capa­
bility. On 21 October two cruisers and two destroyers from the British 
home fleet, known as Force K, arrived at Valetta harbor, considerably 
increasing the British threat to the Libyan convoy route. Axis convoy 
losses during October neared JO per cent of the total leaving Italy, By 
the end of the month the Italian Wavy considered the direct route to 
Tripoli completely closed, while the Benghazi route remained only 
pr 
partially open. Expecting an imminent British offensive, Rommel 
appealed directly to the Fuehrer for aid. 
In answer to Rommel's request. Hitler agreed to the transfer of 
a few long range night fighter squadrons to the Mediterranean. These 
units, he expected, could Inflict considerable damage by surprise raids 
on aircraft landing at night on Jfelta. In addition to the night fight­
ers, Hitler ordered another 25 U-boats to the Mediterranean.he 
remained reluctant to undertake fuU scale commitment to the Mediterran-
ean. His offer of a few air units was a token gesture and one that 
could not be expected to reverse the situation. Instead, Hitler 
attempted to increase the Italian effort, and he again offered his 
2^Weichold, Axis Naval Policy. 55-56. 
^^iddell Hart, The Rommel Papers» I55. 
^^eichold. Axis Naval Policy. 56-57» 
^^Hltler to Mussolini, 29 October 19^1. Documents on German 
Foreign Policy. Ser» D, XIII, Doc, No» k33} 714-15, 
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advice to the Duce» In a letter to Mussolini, Hitler-urged total 
commitment of the Italian Air Force in neutralizing the island of Malta. 
pQ 
The Fuehrer also suggested ti^têning the blockade of the island. 
The threat of a British offensive required that another attempt 
be made to send a large Axis convoy thTOugh to North Africa in November» 
On 8 November reconnaissance aircraft from Malta reported an Axis convoy 
off Cape Spartlvento. The convoy, including seven merchant ships 
escorted by 10 destroyers and two cruisers^ was heading for Libya via 
Greece and Crete. Force K sailed from Valetta to intercept» In the 
following action the British sank ixro Italian destroyers and all seven 
of the merchant ships. This disastrous loss seriously hampered Rommel's 
plan for an Axis offensive to offset obvious British preparations and 
c a u s e d  e v e n  g r e a t e r  I t a l i a n  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  c o n t i n u e  s u c h  c o n v o y s T h e  
battle of supplies was no longer a battle--it was a rout. Italy could 
not remedy the situation^ and since It was apparent that German aid 
would not suffice, the Duce again appealed to Hitler. 
^Wsollni emphasized to the Fuehrer that the situation was 
urgent, British operations from Malta—air, submarine, and now surface 
ships—made it necessary to protect Axis convoys with large naval 
escorts. He stated that the passage of a convoy to North Africa was a 
major mllliary operation and required more than naval protection. 
Although the increased activities of the Italian Air Force were having 
some effect, Mussolini stressed that German aid was required. The Duce 
^^Conversation between Hitler and Ciano, 26 October 19^1. 
Documents on German Foreign Policy. Ser, D, XIII, Doc, No, 42^1 688, 
^%layfair^ The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 103-04. 
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concluded: 
I am convinced that the dispatch of an additional German air corps 
to southern Italy will give us an overwhelming superiority over the 
enemy and will also result in the neutralization of Malta ,30 
On 21 November Hitler finally agreed to make a major commitment 
of Luftwaffe units to the I«fediterranean, hut his decision was a result 
of the British offensive in North Africa and not Mussolini's request. 
The British 8th Army launched its attack on 18 November, anticipating 
Bommel's offensive "by three days. The Fuehrer's decision to transfer 
German forces to the Mediterranean came too late to change the Immediate 
situation, and Itommel retreated across Cyrenaica.^^ With the success of 
the British Army, Royal Air Force units "began to operate from Cyrenaican 
"bases and gained even greater control of the Axis supply route. Axis 
convoy losses for November were almost 75 per cent of the total "bound 
for Li"bya, Only 8,400 tons of supplies arrived in Libya during the 
BKJnth, the lowest delivery of the Mediterranean war,^^ 
To lessen British domination of the central Mediterranean, 
Hitler planned a significant increase in German air strength, but 
Germany's attempt to regain the initiative began at sea. On 17 November 
the German submarine U-81 sank the British aircraft carrier Ark fioyalj a 
week later TJ-331 torpedoed and sank the battleship Barham. The U-boats 
continued their success with the sinking of two British cruisers off 
3^Wssolini to Hitler, 6 November 1941. Donnrnmnts on German 
Foreign Policy. Ser. D, XIII, Doc. No, 454j 752-53. 
3^Llddell Hart, T^a Rnnrniml PapAfs. 173. 
3^Andrew Browne Cunningham, A Sailor's Odvssev (London; Hutchin­
son and Co. Ltd., 1951)> 420. 
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Alexsindrla in December, vindicating Hitler's decision to transfer Genaan 
sulsmarines to the area. A further reduction of British naval strength 
occwred with the loss of the battleships Que em Elizabeth and Valiant 
from an atiack by Italian two-man torpedo teams in Alexandria harbor» 
Britain's position in the Mediterranean, which appeared formidable in 
early fall ipli-l, had changed drastically by November. The return of the 
Luftwaffe portended furttier reverses for British strategy, particularly 
concerning the British naval base at Malta, 
On 28 November 19*H Hitler appointed Field Marshal Kesselring 
Commander-in-Chief South (Oberbefehlshaber Sud)The Fuehrer ordered 
Fliegerkorps II, under the command of General Loerzer, withdrawn from 
the Easteisi front and combined with Fliegerkorps X to form the 2nd Air 
Fleet* The reor^mized air fleet Included three bomber squadrons, two 
dive bomber groups, three fighter groups, plus reconnaissance aircraft 
and anti-aircraft units. Hitler stated that these units were to "estab­
lish a center of strength for the Axis powers in the central Msditerran-
ean,"^5 He informed the Duce that the Jfediterranean was to be the main 
theater of operations for the Wehmacht. But the Fuehrer relied on a 
limited commitment of the Wehrmacht, similar to German policy in the 
previous year, German strategy again did not plan to take advantage of 
the situation and achieve total victory. Hitler's goal was to prevent a 
33Kurt Assman, Deutsche Schicksals.iahre (Wiesbaden; Eberhard 
Brockhaus, 1951)# 353. 
3^Albert Kesselring, Kesselring. A Soldier's Record, trans, by 
Lynton Hudson-(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1^4), II6. 
^^uehrer's Directive Ho. 38# 2 December 19%1. ^ciment8_on 
German Foreign Policy. Ser. D, xm. Doc. No. 5351 938-390 
collapse of the ffediterranean front. 
Keaselring's main task was the elimination of Malta by air 
attack. Neutralization of the island meant the securing of the Sicilian 
Straits for Axis convoys and Interdiction of British east-west maritime 
traffic. The German Supreme Command, however^ had no plans to caplaire 
the Island in November 1941. Kesselring asked the Fuehrer, after his 
appointment as CIC South, if Ifeilta was so important to the Mediterranean 
war, why shouldn't Germany follow up the air attack and occupy the 
island? Hitler replied that there were no forces available for such an. 
operation, 
units in the Mediterranean. Theoretically, he was subordinate only to 
the king and the Duce in the southern theater of operations. Commando 
Supremo resented this intrusion, but Kesselring was willing to cooperate 
with the Italian staff rather than assert his authority. He exercised 
direct control only over the Luftwaffe and those air and naval forces 
assigned to him by Commando Supremo. Rommel, although subject to 
General Bastlco^^ and Commndo Supremo, retained his own command and 
answered directly to 0,K,¥, and the Fuehrer. 
The 2nd Air Fleet opened its attack on 21 December with a raid 
on Malta's airfields, Kesselring*s plan was first to eliminate the 
island's fighter defenses, either on the ground In surprise attacks or 
Kesselring's appointment gave him comnand of all Germn air 
A Soldier's Record. 116. 
^^General Ettore Bastico succeeded General (feriboldi as CIC 
Armed Forces in North Africa on 12 July 1941. 
3®Report No, A-578, "The German Air Force in Italy," 3, 
"by aerial combato The second phase involved mass bombing of tfelta's 
three airfields to handicap the arrival of any reinforcements „ Œh© 
final attack votuLd be concentrated against the harbor area» It took 
tim©^ however^ to build up the necessary ground organization and supply 
network before Inauguration of large scale raidso Jfeanwhile^ the 
Luftwaffe flew protection for supplies to Libya, 
The British Cyrenaican offensive ended on 12 January 19^2, 
Eoarnel halted his retreat at El Agheila and both armies awaited further 
supplieso Air and submrine operations from îfelta gave Britain the edge 
in logistic operations during the fall of Ig^l^ but the return of the 
Luftwaffe soon reversed the situationo Between 30 December and 5 
January^ more than 400 aircraft attacked ffeilta's airfields o When a 
large Axis convoy of fuel and tanks arrived safely at Tripoli without 
challenge on 5 January^ Rommel cozmnented that this convoy was "as good 
as a victory in battleWith his supply line apparently secured by 
the presence of the Luftwaffe^ Eonnnel launched his counteroffensIve on 
21 January» Meanwhile, Kesselring undertook his primary mission--the 
neutralization of îfelta. 
The Luftwaffe raided the island both day and night. Junker 88 
bombers combined with dlvebombiag Stukae for alternate high and low 
^^Kesselrlng^ A Soldier's Eecord. 139° 
^^Maclntyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean. 125o 
^^Liddell Hart, The Bommel Papers. 180* 
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level attackso The Initial raids succeeded in destroying many British 
aircraft before they could take to the air a Those which tecame airTsome 
faced overwhelming odds. Heavy "bombing cratered the island's three 
airfields, and the frequency of the raids hampered the attenrpts of work 
crews to repair the damage® During January there were 262 raide^ which 
Kessèlring classified as "minor," designed merely to prepare the way for 
the massive attacks planned for early spring « The preliminary raids 
succeeded in reducing Malta's total fighter defense to 28 operational 
aircraft at the end of January! the number dropped to 11 by I5 February 
The arrival of the Luftwaffe had completely changed the situation in the 
central Mediterranean, In January 1^2 not a single ship was lost on 
the Libyan convoy route. 
The success of the Luftwaffe attack depended on halting any 
further supplies from reaching the island. By constantly patrolling the 
sea lanes to Malta, Eesselring intended to prevent relief to the 
beleaguered fortress. The British attempt to force through a convoy to 
the island on 18 February failed. Not a single ship reached Valetta,^^ 
Hitler and 0,K,W, realized that if the Luftwaffe could achieve 
effective blockade of the Island, Malta would not have to be captured— 
it would fall to the Axis without a shot. The Commander of the British 
garrison, Lieut, General Sir William Bobbie, acknowledged that after the 
^%unker 88 bombers were the conventional "glide bombers," Baey 
were twin engine monoplanes with a maximum speed of 295 mop,h„ and a 
bombload of 2;,200 lbs. The Stufes, JU-Sys, were the "dive bombers," 
They were sin^e engine monoplanes with a nBXiimim speed of 2k^ m,poh, 
and a bombload of 1,100 lbs, 
^^Macintyre, The Battle for the tfediterranean, 126. 
^^Cumlngham, A Sailor's Odyssey» 4%2-%3« 
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failure of the February convoy, Malta was reduced to siege level. 
Dobbie anticipated that the island's defenders could hold out no later 
than the end of June without further supplies The continued effso= 
tiveness of -Qie Luftwaffe, however, was the major question to Axis 
military strategists. Once before, from January to ^farch 19^1^ the 
island had appeared "neutralized," yet once the pressure of continual 
air raids ended, Malta had regained the offensive, Jfeny Axis advisers, 
including Field Marshal Eesselring, argued that air attack alone was not 
enou^. 
Eesselring consistently advised the German Supreme Command that 
the final solution of the supply problem to Libya required the capture 
of Malta, He considered failure to follow up the air attack with a 
landed invasion a strategic error.General Cavallero,^? Commando 
Supremo Chief of Staff, supported Eesselring's argument. For once it 
was the Italians who took the initiative, 
Cavallero and Commando Supremo began to study the possibilities 
of an invasion of Ifalta soon after the arrival of the LiafIsmffe „ In 
January 19^2 the Italian General Staff actually began training its 
forces for a combined sea end air invasion of the Island, Cavallero 
believed that Italian troops alone could capture the island, with the 
^5piayfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. IH, 160-61, 
Bobbie estimated 15,000 tons of supplies had to arrive each imnth in 
order to maintain the stocks at the present level. 
^^Kesselrlng, A Soldier's Record. I5O-5I, 
^^General Ugo Cavallero was appointed Chief of Staff In December 
1940, succeeding Marshal Badoglio, Cavallero was promoted to Jfershal In 
July 194^2. He was regarded as an excellent organizer and a pro-German, 
His removal by the Duce in January 19%3 caused discomfit in Berlin, 
support of the Luftwaffe. But ComnmJâo S'upremo did not plan for as. 
Immediate assaulto Special landing craft had to be devised to cope wl# 
the island's rocky coast, and airborne units needed special preparationso 
Cavallero expected that the assault force would be ready by about the 
first of Juue®^^ Jfeanwhlle, the Luftwaffe must complete its neutraliza­
tion of iiie Island's defenses» A number of different plans were consid­
ered by Commando Supremo, including on© submitted by the Japanese, who 
had proven by January 19%2 to be experts at amphibious operations, 
The air raids on the island steadily increased duriag February » 
At the end of the month Kesselrlng reported to Eeichsmrschal Goerimg 
that due to the Luftwaffe success against Malta, the convoy route was 
secured. He noted that Axis shipping passed within 100 miles of the 
island with little danger* The Commander^In-Chief South, however, 
continued to press for a commitment of the Wehrmacht to an invasion of 
the island. At a conference with Hitler in February, the Field Marshal 
appeared to have won the Fuehrer's approval: 
Hitler ended the argument by grasping me by the arm and telling me 
in his Austrian dialects "Keep your shirt on. Field Marshal feseel» 
ring, I'm going to do it|"50 
But Hitler had no such intention in February 19^2 o As in the 
previous year, German intervention in the Mediterranean sought no long 
tem objectives. The precarious situation in North Africa had dictated 
^^Enno von Eintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse (Lelns; I95I), 
165. In March 19^2 the Prince of Piedmont was selected to head •&© 
operation» 
^9piayfair, T3ie Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 175o 
^^Kesselring, A Soldier's Becord. 123-24. 
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the dispatch of the 2nd Air Fleet to Sicily, The losses of Axis shipping 
on the North African convoy route had been an Iraruediate problem requiring 
Imaedlate German attentiono It was the Eastern front that had remined 
Hitler's overriding concern in the winter of 19%l-%2« His aimouncemeat 
to Itossolinl that the Mediterranean theater would become the major 
concern of the Wehrmacht had been no more than a sop to his Axis partner 
and not to be taken seriously « German military strategists^ however, 
objected to the Fuehrer's short term policy„ 
Admiral Eaeder advised Hitler in February 19%2 that since the 
Axis ruled both the air and the sea in the central Mediterranean^ 
Germai^ should develop the situation to her advantage. The naval 
commander emphasized that such favorable conditions would not be 
repeated. He urged Hitler to consider a full scale attack oa Egypt and 
Suez.In, focusing on Suez, Eaeder hoped to win Gearmany's commitment 
to a Mediterranean victory and turn the Fuehrer's attention from the 
Eastern front, Eaeder's argument offered the Suez Canal as a major 
strategic prize worth total German commitment. Malta was not mentioned. 
Although Eaeder considered tJie capture of Jfelta vital to the success of 
a Suez operation, it was far easier to argue for Suez than for îfelta. 
Hitler, however, did not believe such an undertaking possible wliiiout a 
further transfer of Geimm units, and this he reimlned mwilling to 
conslder.^^ Hitler continued to rely on the Luftwaffe to solve the more 
immediate problem of îfelta, 
^^Fuehrer Conferences. 13 February 19^2, 10. 
^%bld.. 10-11. 
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The second phase of the air attack "began in March, "by which time 
the 2nd. Air Fleet comprised 335 operational aircraft. air raids 
reduced the island's air "bases to ru'b'bleo The Luftwaffe flew nearly 
5,000 sorties in March, as compared with 2,500 in the previous month, 
"but Malta's defenders continued to inflict considerable losses on the 
attackerso One reason was that certain features of the island made 
conventional air raids difficult, Kesselring reported: 
There were natural shelters hewn out of the [lime-] stone rock on the 
perimeter of the airfields and around the har'bour where aircraft aaad 
stores could "be safeguarded and against which even the heaviest 
delayed-action "boiobs could not have a really devastating effect»^^ 
Low level attacks were often necessary, giving British anti-aircraft 
"batteries exceptional opportunities « 
Although the Luftwaffe raids pounded the island's military 
installations, Britain recognized that Malta's greatest concern was lack 
of supplies. General Dobbie estimated that food would last a few more 
months, and the British desperately needed ammunition for anti-aircraft 
defenses and fuel for the few remaining aircraft. To relieve "Wie 
fortress, Churchill decided to attempt another convoy run. The British 
convoy that approached the Island on 20 îferch was sighted ty German 
reconnaissance aircraft from Sicily, Kesselring ordered it destroyed, 
and assigned 326 "bombers and fighters of the 2nd Air Fleet to the task. 
Only two ships with a total of 5,000 tons of supplies reached Malta, "but 
these two delivered the much-needed ammunition and fuel oil and ena"bled 
Malta's defenses to remain functioning, 
^^Eesselring, A Soldier's Record. l40. 
5^tfe,cintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean. 136-39» 
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The March convoy proved that Britain had no intention of 
surrendering the island and that the Luftwaffe alone could not com­
pletely "blockade the island. In view of these facts^ Admiral Raeder 
again advised Hitler in March 19^2 not to abandon the Mediterranean 
until a final decision was won ty the Axis forces. Baeder emphasized 
that because of the recent air attacks, Malta's defenses offered no 
serious risk to an invasion attempt by Axis troops and with Malta 
secured Suez could then be taken. If Axis troops were not available for 
such a task, Raeder argued. It was vital to retain the Luftwaffe in 
Sicily at full strength, or Britain could regain the offensive 
In considering Raeder's advice, Hitler replied that a coufcined 
Axis operation was doubtful. One reason was that he distrusted Italian 
support in a combined invasion of Malta and did not believe that 
Commando Supremo would actually carry out its invasion plan. Hitler 
acknowledged that capture of the island would greatly facilitate a Suez 
offensive, but only if the Luftwaffe was not required for other duty, 
either on the Eastern front or to oppose a British challenge la the 
west. 
Field Marshal Kesselring and General Rommel supported Raeder's 
argument. In March lSk2 Kesselring prepared a report for the German 
Supreme Command on the possibility of German forces joining the Italians 
already in training. O.K.W., however, showed little interest in a 
combined operation to talfô Malta, and expressed doubt that the Italians 
^^Fuehrer Conferences. 12 March 19^2, 18. 
S^Ibid. 
alone could, carry out the operation, even with Luftwaffe support. As 
late as the end of March 19^2 Keitel wrote to Kesselring: 
One cannot very well tell the Italians that they mi^t as well 
cancel their preparations for the invasion of Malta because they 
will not get îfelta anyway » o o tat #iey should Tse told now that 
when Luftflotte [air fleet] 2's "bombing of the island has been 
successfully completed, one reconoaissance Staff el [squadron], two 
tomber Gruppen [groups] and three fighter Grnppen will have to be 
withdrawn, 57 
Keitel added that the remaining forces of the 2nd Air Fleet 
could assist "Wie Italians and perhaps, with the Fuehrer's approval, one 
or two airborne regiments, if the Italians actually undertook an Inva*» 
58 
sion of the island. 0„K«¥,, Kesselring, and Coimjando Supremo all 
agreed, however, that completion of ihe Luftwaffe's missioa-"the 
neutralization of Malta--mu8t precede any Invasion attempt. 
The third phase of the Luftwaffe's attack began in April, Field 
Marshal Kesselring directed the main force of the attack to the island's 
harbor areas. More than three times the total of bombs fell on the 
island in April than in the previous month. The Luftwaffe flew over $00 
sorties on 7 and 8 April alone, with Grand Harbor, the main British 
naval base, as the major target. The air raids destroyed docking facil­
ities, warehouses, harbor defenses, and repair yards. In less than 
three weeks more than 2,000 sorties were flown against Grand Harbor, 
with approximately 1,900 tons of bombs dropped on the dockyards and 
adjacent areas. Bombing raids nearly destroyed the city of Valetta. 
The British evacuated most of the population to the interior of the 
57weichold, Axis Naval Policy. 77, 
5®Ibid. 
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island. Only work crews remained. During April Malta underwent the 
heaviest concentrated "bombing of the war until that date,^^ while the 
Luftwaffe lost only 35 aircraft during the month 
The April raids were disastrous for the island's defenders» The 
Jfalta Defence Committee estimated at the end of the month that only 3^ 
days' supply of "basic foodstuffs remained„ Anti-aircraft ammunition was 
nearly exhausted. Although Malta desperately needed the arrival of a 
convoy^ the Defence Committee admitted that this was Impossible until 
the air supremacy of the Luftwaffe could "be challenged » General 
DotMe appealed to London for aid. 
Prime Minister Churchill recognized the island's precarious 
situation and saw that the first task was to reinforce îfelta'e air 
defenses. In April Churchill requested from President Rcoaevelt the 
loan of the UeS, aircraft carrier to ferry British Spitfire 
aircraft^^ to Malta. Because of its size. Wasp could deliver as many 
aircraft in one mission as could a British carrier in three trips. 
Eoosevelt immediately agreed, and on 20 April Wasp reached the Mediter­
ranean, The carrier launched kj aircraft, 46 of which landed safely at 
^^Prior to the April raids on Malta, the Coventry raid was con­
sidered to have delivered the greatest concentrated homibing attack. 
Later, of course, the massive raids over Germany, e.g* Dresden, Hamburg, 
etc., far exceeded the tombing of Malta. 
^%acintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean. 139~^1» 
^^hurchill. The Hinge-of Fate. 261-62. 
^%pltfires were single engine monoplane fighters with a mxlmum 
speed of 375 m.p.h» and a range of %80 miles. 
the hastily repaired airfields on Malta. 
The Luftwaffe, however, had not "been caught unaware. Ninety 
minutes after the Spitfires' arrival, the Luftwaffe attacked. The 
surprise raid destroyed three-quarters of the newly arrived aircraft on 
the ground and ended the British attempt to redress the balance of air 
supremacy. Britain paid heavily for her prewar failure to construct 
adequate underground hangars, 
Althou^ the Luftwaffe played the dominant role in neutralizing 
Malta, the German Navy also participated. German E-boats^ systemati­
cally mined Malta's ports and the access routes to the island. In the 
spring of 1^2 the E=boats, often working in close proximity to shore 
defenses, laid 23 minefields with a total of 557 mines. The effective-
iwss of the minefields forced the removal of the British 10th Submarine 
Flotilla to Alexandria on 26 Apr 11.^^ German U-boat operations in the 
Sicilian Straits also contributed to the closing of Malta's sea 
approaches, while in addition, German submarine activities in Cyrenaican 
waters disrupted British coastal traffic and contributed significantly 
to the success of the Afrika Korps,^^ Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe gained 
an increasing ascendancy in the skies above Malta, 
After inspecting the results of the air raids on Jfelta during 
^^Churchill, The Hinge of Fate. 266-67. 
^^E-boats were ll^t, fast craft utilized as minelayers and also 
for group attack on British merchant ships. During Eommel's 19^2 cam­
paign, they often supported Axis coastal shipping. The E-boats arrived 
in the Mediterranean via the Rhine and the Rhone, 
^^Weichold, Axis Naval Policy. 74, 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, II7-I8. 
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the first part of Aprll^ Essselring considered that his mission was 
nearly accomplished. He reported to Hitlers 
The planned air attack on, Malta laetween 1-9 April has in my opinion, 
eliminated Malta as a naval "base. The shipyards and dock installa­
tions have "been so "badly damaged that there can "be no question of 
using Malta as a base for a long time to coms,°T 
Kesselring, however^ continued to argue for a Qenmn commitment to an 
invasion of the island, which he considered to "be iii© natural conclusion 
to the Luftwaffe's achievement. He proposed a slackening off period 
"before the final air attack on the island in support of an Axis invasion. 
The question was whether the Fuehrer would agree to German participation 
in the operation. 
Eessèlring's argumentsupported "by the naval staff^ had caused 
0,K,¥, "by April 19^2 to reconsider the proposal^ and^ convinced that the 
Italians were willing to cooperate in a combined operation^ Field 
Ifa.3?shal Keltel recommended to Hitler the capture of IWLta. On 21 April 
Hitler tentatively gave his approval of German support to an. Axis inva­
sion of Maltaj, "bat at the same time he expressed his dou'bts as to the 
availability of ttie Wehrmacht for the task. If German forces were 
needed elsewhere, he declared, Germany could spare no forces for îfelta,^® 
Having gained Hitler's approval, 0,K,W„ ordered two German 
parachute regiments to Viter"bo to "begin joint training with t&ie Italians» 
The German Supreme Command assigned General Kurt Student, em expert In 
airborne operations, as the Gemaan Commander and approved the formtlon 
^7Msirt lens sen. Hitler and His Admirals. 127. 
"Andreas Hillgru"ber, ed,, Krlegstages'buch des Oterkommido der 
Wehjrmacht 1940-1945 (Frankfurt am îfeln; BemSd & Gmefe, 19^3"n. 
Part 1. Hereafter cited as Hillgruber, ed , K.T.B. des OcK.¥<, 
of a combined Axis staff headed ty General Gandin, under Comnando 
Supremo, to carry out the operational planning 
Hitler's interest in the Mediterranean theater of var had 
steadily increased since the return of the Luftwaffe to Sieily in the 
fall of Initio His approval of the combined Axis staff to sttsdy prepara­
tions for the capture of Malta, the first and only such Axis planning 
"board of the entire war, indicates this increased concern for the future 
conduct of Mediterranean operations. Yet the Fuehrer's consent was 
conditional» Kesselring'a report of the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe 
raids suggested to Hitler that perhaps air attack alone could solve the 
problem, rather than risking an invasion of -ttie island, as Kesselring 
had intended, Eonmel's reg_uest to the Fuehrer for approval to undertake 
a major desert offensive at the end of îfey 1^42 further increased 
Hitler's doubts as to the wisdom or the necessity of undertaking an 
invasion of Malta, which would involve an extensive coannitment of #ie 
Wehrmacht. 
Hitler hesitated in reaching a final commitment on the capture 
of Malta, The decision for a combined Axis operation could not he taken 
lightly. Before reaching a final decision. Hitler agreed to the Duce's 
request for a political meeting to be held at Salzburg on 29 April, to 
be followed the next day by a military summit meeting on Mediterranean 
strategy at Berchtes^den, The fate of îfelta depended upon the outcome 
of the conference, 
^%intelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. 16$, General Aldo 
Gandin was a General Staff Officer of Commando Supremo who was formez-
ly secretary to the Itelian Chief of Staff, 
GE&PTER I? 
OEEMTION HERHJiiES 
The military summit conference of the Axis leaders at Berehtea^ 
gaden^ scheduled for 30 April 19^2^ was one of a small number of such 
meetings held "by Germany and Italy to outline Axis strategy» These 
infrequent sessions were the only opportunity for a direct exchange of 
infomiation on military matters %etwe@m the Axis partners » lo oomblned 
operational staff or Axis war planning board existed "before April 19^2^ 
primarily because of the basic mistrust between the two allies.^ Always 
dominated by the charismatic and forceful figure of Hitler^ #ie confer­
ences were often no more than an exposition of German views with 
Mussolini adding his approval of Hitler's intentions. 
Mussolini operated at an obvious disadvantage in such discus» 
8ions. The failure of Italian arms forced an increasing dependence on 
German strength by the spring of 1^2, and an end to idie myth of 
"parallel war»" To prevent the collapse of his tottering colonial 
empire in Africa, Mussolini reluctantly acknowledged that massive German 
aid was required. It was to gain an extended conmiitment of the Wehrmacht 
to the Mediterranean theater of war that Mussolini requested a meeting 
^arlimont, "The Decision in the Mediterranean 19%2, " in 
Decisive Battles of World War II. 188. Hereafter cited as Warllmont, 
"The Decision in the îfediterraneano" 
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wlth the Fuehrer» The Duce's primary objective was to secure Hitler's 
final agreement to a combined Axis invasion of Maita.^ 
Although Hitler on 21 April gave his tentative approval for a 
combined Axis invasion of Malta, codenamed Operation Eerkules, he 
remained skeptical about actually undertaking such an operations^ He 
believed that the Italians were unreliable, and that their apparent 
willingness to carry out an invasion of Malta was probably transitory» 
Hitler welcomed Mussolini's reçLuest for a meeting, however, for he 
considered it necessary to resolve the objectives and the timetable for 
k 
Axis summer operations in the Mediterranean, The Fuehrer expected that 
the Berchtesgaden conference could resolve these problems and arrive at 
a final decision on the proposed invasion of Ifeilta. 
The Berchtesgaden conference was preceded by a political confer­
ence between Mussolini and Hitler at Schloss Klessheim^ near Salzburg, 
Austria, on 29 AprilJ^ At Elesshelm Hitler reviewed the entire politi­
cal spectrum. Concerning the Mediterranean theater of war. Hitler 
announced that because of Franco's hesitation in joining the Axis, the 
proposed operation to capture Gibraltar was no longer feasible. Hie 
Fuehrer reported that a more favorable situation existed with respect to 
Turkey, which appeared ready to join the Italo-German war effort, while 
^Warlimont, "The Decision in the Mediterranean," 188. 
^Eintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. l66, 
^arlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters. 236. 
^The conferences of 29 and 30 April are often recorded as being 
one conference, held at either Berchtesgaden or Salzburg. They were, 
however, two separate conferences. At Schloss Elesshelm only Mussolini, 
Hitler, Clano, and Elbbentrop were present. 
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in French Worth Africa the political situation appeared stable» Musso­
lini interjected that the use of Bizerte as an Axis port could signifi­
cantly improve the problem, of transporting supplies to North Africa. 
Hitler acknowledged this possibility but gave no encouragement to 
Mussolini's ambitions for French territoryWith the conclusion of 
"ttie political discussion, the meeting adjourned to Berchtesgaden, where 
the German and Italian military staffs awaited the arrival of the Axis 
leaders. 
The Berchtesgaden conference opened on 30 April,The main 
subject of the meeting and the only military operation discussed in 
detail was the capture of Malta, General Cavallero, representing 
Commando Supremo, argued that Operation Eerkules was essential to the 
continued prosecution of the Mediterranean war, ajid urged that the Axis 
consider it as its inmediate objective. Until ffelta was eliminated, he 
O 
argued, the Axis could not win a decisive victory in the Mediterranean, 
Althou^ the Italian staff insisted that Malta should be the immediate 
objective of the Axis, CavaUero acknowledged that the Italian prepara­
tions for undertaking Operation Eerkules could not be completed for 
another three months.^ 
^Conversation between Hitler and Mussolini at Schloss Klesshelm, 
29 April- 1942» The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XV, No9 367 (1% 
July 19^6), 57-^3! 
"^The principal figures at the meeting, besides Hitler and Bbsso-
llni, were Field Marshal Keltel, General Jodl, Field Marshal Kesselring, 
Captain Junge, General Cavallero, General Gtendln, and probably Admiral 
Elccardl. Rommel did not attend. 
%lrkpatrick, Mussolini. 5IO. 
^arlimont, "The Decision In the Mediterranean," 188. 
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0,K,¥,, represented "by Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl, 
supported Operation Herkules and was prepared to commit the necessary 
aid to insure its success, upon the Fuehrer's approval. Field Marshal 
Eesselrlng reported that the success of the recent air offensive on 
Malta had opened the way for an Axis invasion of the islandCaptain 
Junge, representing the naval staff, agreed that capture of Malta was a 
necessary prerequisite for an Axis advance to the Suez Canal^ which was 
the ultimate objective of Axis strategy in the Mediterranean»^^ Hitler, 
however, expressed his doubts concerning the necessity of such an 
operation. 
Hitler preferred "bypassing Malta and launching an Axis invasion 
across Egypt to Suez. He regarded Egypt as "ripe for revolution" and 
expected that the Egyptian government would welcome an Axis victory. 
Moreover, Hitler indicated that because of the Luftwaffe success in 
Intercepting British attempts to supply îfelta, perhaps Britain should be 
allowed to retain the Island, for in this manner Malta would serve as a 
steady dra,in on British Mediterranean resources. Hitler emphasized also 
that an invasion of Jfelta would req.uire extraordinary preparations 
IP 
because in the event of failure, the operation could not be repeated. 
O.K.W. advised the Fuehrer that the preparations and planning for the 
operation appeared more than adequate for success. In the spring of 
1942 Hitler still listened to his advisers, and In the face of what 
lOwarlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters. 236. 
^Erlch Eaeder, Mv Life, trans, by Henry W, Drexel (Annapolis, 
Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 19^0), 365, 
^%illgruber, ed,, E.T.B. des O.E.W.. 101. 
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appeared to "be unanimo'us agreeinent^ he reluctantly gave his approval for 
Operation Herkules, He emphasized, however, that in the event of a 
British attack in the west, the Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean 
would have to he transferred to meet the challenge. 
]ji reply to a question "by Cavallero, Hitler promised large scale 
Gennan participation in the attack on Malta. Besides the Luftwaffe 
forces already in the Mediterranean and the parachute "battalion assigned 
there on 21 April to train with Italian troops, Germany would provide at 
least an air transport fleet, landing craft, and tanks. The details 
were left to he worked out by the recently organized Axis planning staff 
headed by General Gandin. 
Hitler's approval of Operation Herkules and the promise of 
extensive German aid concluded the basic question before the conference. 
The next issue to be settled was when the operation would take place, 
and here the brief unanimity of the Axis ended. Die problem concerned 
the timetable for Eommel's offensive, which the Commander of the Afrlka 
15 
Eorps believed could not be delayed beyond the end of Ifey. His 
request to Hitler in mid-April, before the conference cœiveneà, for a 
transfer of Luftwaffe units to North Africa in support of his desert 
canç)aign upset Italian plans to hold all Axis air strength In Sicily and 
Italy for the preliminary air attack on Malta before undertaking the 
^%illgruber, éd., K.T.B. des O.K.W.. 101. Hitler had already 
transferred, two groups of JU-BSs and two groups of ME-1098 to the west. 
Replacement was to be made by Italian bombers and fighters to keep îfelta 
suppressed. 
%bld. 
l^Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers. 193°'9^° 
final gissault—Operation Herkules, 
Eommel's request to launch an offensive in Cyrenaica vas not 
intended to forestall the capture of Malta» On the contrary, the 
Commander of the Afrika Kbrps was a firm advocate of such an operation, 
and had repeatedly urged O.K.W. to capture the island since his arrival 
in Libya, more than a year "before. Constantly "beset "by supply problems, 
Eommel realized more than any of the Axis strategists at Berchtesgaden 
the importance of capturing Malta, But in April 19^2 Rommel faced the 
immediate prospect of a British offensive. Determined to maintain the 
initiative, Eommel prepared to offset the intentions of the British 
8th Army by attacking first, and, if possible, to capture the Tobruk 
garrison which guarded the eastern land route to EgyptEommel 
insisted, however, that air support was vital to the success of the 
proposed desert campaign. It was the question of Luftwaffe support that 
most concerned the Axis leaders at Berchtesgaden. 
The military advisers at the conference realized that the 
Luftwaffe could not perform both a3signments--0peration Herkules and 
support of the Afrika Korps—simultaneously.^'^ One must precede the 
other. General Cavallero argued that the Axis should undertake Herkules 
before the Afrika K^rps launched any major desert offensive. Only then, 
xfi 
he insisted, could the supply line to North Africa finally be secured, 
O.K,W, recognized, however, that such a schedule, because of the 
^^Deakin, The Brutal Friendship. 18, 
^^Elllgmber, ed„, K.T.B, des 0,K,W.. 102. 
^^Rintelen, Missolinl als Bundesgenosse. l66„ 
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admitted Italian delays, would mean a surrender of the Axis initiative 
in the Mediterranean theater until at least July, when Italy completed 
her preparations for Herkules » Field Marshal Kesselring believed that 
the Axis forces should capture Jfelta before Rommel's attack in Cyrenaica, 
Taut if Operation Herkules could not be tindertaken before the first of 
June, then the desert campaigi must begin 
The Italian staff was, of course, forced to accept the German 
argument, Cavallero, however, hoped to limit the objectives and •fee 
duration of the desert campaign, for he feared that an extended attack 
would end the Geiman commitment to the capture of Malta. On this final 
point the German and Italian staffs reached a compromise agreement: 
Eommel would begin his offensive at the end of May, and in a campaign, of 
about two weeks, would attempt to capture Tobruk, In no case was he to 
advance beyond the Libyan-Egyptian border.Hitler and fAissolini 
approved the decisions of the military staffs, and the conference 
adjourned. 
Much of the preparation for Operation Herkules had already been 
completed by the time of the Berchtesgaden conference. The Italians had 
begun their training for the assault in January 19^1, but it was not 
until April that O.K.W, had taken an interest and, with the Fuehrer's 
tentative approval, ordered the commitment of troops to joint training 
at Viterbo, Hitler's final commitment to the operation at Berchtes^iden 
allowed the combined Axis planning staff to prepare the details of the 
^^Eintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. l66, 
^^Hlllgruber, ed., K.T.B. des O.K.W.. 102. 
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iiïvasion plan. Between April and Jme 1942 this staff •undertook the 
preparations for the capture of Malta. 
In considering German strategy toward Malta, one must study 
Operation Herkules. The plan dominated German policy toward the island 
Tsetween April and Jiine 1942. An analysis of the logistical and opera­
tional preparations to capture the island allows a critical evaluation 
of the problems of Axis cooperation, German commitment to the operation, 
and what chances the plan had for success. 
With the approval of Commando Supremo, O.K.W. assigned General 
Student as the operational commander of Operation Herkules. His second 
in command was General Eamcke, while General Gandin headed the Axis 
planning staff. In addition to the German airbome units already in 
training at Viterto, O^K.W. ordered the transfer of auxiliary ground 
units and air transport forces to southern Italy, which "by Ifey 19^2 
included two parachute divisions, an artillery and a flak regiment, a 
machine gun "battalion, one or two heavy mortar "batteries, and an 
engineer battalion. Hitler also offered 12 Panzer lYs for use in the 
capture of Malta and at least 10 Russian tanks captured in the first 
Op 
summer offensive against the Soviet Union» The Axis staff estimated 
that "between 35,000 and 40,000 Italian and German troops would "be 
employed in the operation. 
The Italian air'bome force assigned to the operation was the 2nd 
Parachute Division, the "Folgore," an elite force trained in air"bome 
^^Eintelen, tfessolini als Bundesgenosse. I65-66. 
2%lllgru"ber, ed., K.T.B. des O.K.W.. 103. 
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operations "by General Bamcke and very hi^ly regarded by its German 
cOTinterparts The main Italian force, however, would land from the 
sea. Commando Supremo approved the commitment of five Italian Amgr 
divisions and six "battalions for the amphibious phase of the operation^ 
while Supermarina^^ during ihe spring and early summer of 19^2 collected 
together an assortment of auxiliary eq^uipment which included 725 
launches and assault boats, 25 motor boats, 80 landing barges, aM 6k-
miscellaneous craft for ferrying purposes 
For the support of the amghibious operation and for the success 
of the entire operation, tiae Axis planning staff insisted that the 
cooperation of the Italian Navy was vital. The Axis did not anticipate 
that the British fleet would sit idly by while the Italo-German forces 
undertook a full scale invasion of Malta, but expected that Britain 
would make every attempt to retain her central Mediterranean base» To 
insure a vigorous and aggressive countering action by the Italian Navy, 
Hitler agreed to provide 40,000 tons of fuel oil to Supermarim, along 
with a furUier 12,000 tons of aviation fuel for the Italian Air Force, 
26 
which would provide the air cover for the Italian naval forceso 
Germany did not intend to allow the usual argument of Supermarina—the 
lack of fuel—to interfere with its capability to undertake aggressive 
action against the Eoyal Navy. As a further precaution against the 
^^Eesselring, A Soldier's Record. 149, f,n.. 
2^The Italian Naval Staff. 
^5Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II. I68, f.n. Much of 
this naval equipment came from German sources. 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 194. 
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expected intervention "by the British fleet, Admiral Eaeder agreed to 
position a flotilla of German submarines in the sea approaches to Malta, 
•both east and west of the island 
An additional problem which concerned the Axis planners was 
transport aircraft for the airtome assault. Major Conrad Seitt, 
assigned to the Headquarters Staff of the German XI Air Force, reported 
to General Student that between 370 and 4-70 transport aircraft, seven to 
28 
ei^t groups of JU-52s with two to three groups of HE-Ills, would 
participate in the opei%tion, while Italian Savoia aircraft would 
transport the 2nd Italian Parachute Division»^^ The major question, 
however, concerned the use of gliders. 
In the initial study of the possibility of capturing Malta, 
undertaken by Germany in the spring of 1941, the use of gliders had been 
discounted due to the island's topography. Aerial reconnaissance had 
revealed that numerous stone walls divided the fields of the island into 
small and irregular patches, axi obvious hazard in the employment of 
^ider aircraft. In reconsidering the problem of landing airborne 
forces for Operation Herfcules in May 19^2, the Axis staff recogiized 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 19%. 
Pft 
JU=-52s were triple engine monoplanes used as transport and 
cargo aircraft with a maximum speed of I65 m.p.h. and a range of 530 to 
790 miles. The HE-lUs were converted from bombers to transport aircraft 
for the operation. They had a maximum speed of 240 m.p.h. and a range 
of 1,510 miles. The Italian Savoia aircraft, S-82s, were triple engine 
monoplanes used as bombers or transport aircraft with a maximum speed of 
205 m.p.h. and a range of 2,200 miles. 
"Preparations for the Capture of Jfelta," prepared by Major 
Conrad Seibt (unpublished report, ^-094), Office of the Chief of 
Militaiy History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 
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that the only open areas for air transport planes to land wotald "be the 
airfields and adjacent parking areas. But as the Luftwaffe planned a 
massive ràid on these areas just prior to the invasion^ the damage to 
the landing strips would prevent the Axis from using the airfields for 
conventional transport planes. Gliders once again appeared to "be the 
solution. 
The use of gliders meant that the stopping distance required hy 
power-driven aircraft would "be greatly shortened. To decrease further 
the required length of open area for the gliders to land safely, the 
gliders would carry spin chutes to increase the drag resistance. Kkijor-
General Gerhard Conrad, the Commander of the XI Air Force, reported to 
General Student that approximately 300 DES=230 and G0=240 gliders would 
he available for the operation,^® 
The logistical problem of the XI Air Force in moving supplies 
for "Uie nearly 40,000 men to he employed in the operation and the 
relocating of the large number of transport aircraft and gliders for 
Operation Herkules was enormous. As the XI German Air Force would "be 
responsible for logistical operations. General Conrad assigned Major 
Seiht to examine the facilities available for concentrating the assault 
force In southern Italy and to provide for the fozmation of supply 
reparations for the Commitment of Parachute and Other 
Airbome Units in the Projected Invasion of ̂ felta, " prepared by Major-
General Gerhard Conrad (unpublished report, MS #D-065), Office of the 
Chief of Military Histoiy, Departmimt of the Army, Washington, D,C, The 
DFS-230 was a light glider which could carry 10 men with light equipment| 
the G0-2l^0 was a larger glider which could carry a 7Tnm anti-tank gun 
and crew, or 20 to 25 men. 
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depota on the "basis of 10 days' fighting,̂  ̂
his experience in the Creteji operation, Major Seitt 
recognized that it vas essential to place the supply depots as near to 
the intended objective as possible. Seibt expected that "by the second 
day of fighting there would be a considerable need of supplies by the 
conibat troops and transport units would have to fly several daytime 
sorties. He concluded that it would be necessary to locate the depots 
in Sicily or southern Calabria, 
In his report Seibt noted that the concentration of forces at 
the juzgo-off point in Sicily would require 32 to 35 days. He stated 
that rail facilities for the movement of supplies were adequate as far 
south as Naples, but in southern Calabria there was only a single track 
railroad, while further difficulties arose at the Straits of Messina, 
where the railroad ferries had a capacity of only 400 cars daily, There 
was also the problem of a shortage of airfields in southern Italy and 
Siâily. After reconnoitering the area, Seibt reported that in Calabria 
only two airfields were available and that only one of these, Crontone, 
could be expanded to receive the concentration of aircraft for the 
operation. Because of the mountainous topography of Calabria, few 
airfields could be added. The airfields on Sicily, Seibt added, were 
numerous, but the bomber and figgiter groupe of the 2nd Air Fleet 
occupied the majority of them. However, on the Catania plain, south and 
3̂ elbt, "Preparations for the Capture of Malta." 
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southeast of Etna, German engineers coulâ clear temporary fields 
The OTJVIOUS Inadequacies mentioned in Seibt's report^ particu­
larly concerning the lack of air strips, caused discomfit at the 
headquarters of the XI Air Force, Although General Conrad anticipated 
the addition of the teaçorary fields in Catania, the logistical prepara­
tions seemed inadequate. As it was General Conrad's mission to direct 
the air transport groups in the commitment of the parachute and airborne 
units to Operation Eerkules, the Commanding General of the XI Air Force 
decided to inspect the preparations himself „ He found that the recently 
constructed airfields in Catania were nothing more than newly harvested 
fields with no facilities for quartering troops, impossible to camou­
flage, and without a water supply, repair shops, or commmlcations 
equipment# Conrad continued his misgivings in a report to General 
Student: 
The airfields impressed me as being not very suitable because a 
great amount of dust would be swirled up during the dry summer» 
Moreover because some of the auxiliary fields were located extremely 
close to each other and laid out along an east-west axis, so that 
during takeoffs into east winds, the planes-=and especially the tow 
tiains--would endanger one another.3^ 
The problems of concentration and supply were difficult but not 
insurmountable, O.K.W, and Commando Supremo were satisfied with •tiie 
initial preparations and confident that the logistical preparations 
could be accomplished well before the operation began. Axis cooperation 
in the preparation of Operation Herkules presented few problems, and the 
^%eibt, "Preparaticas for the Capture of Malta," 
^^Conrad, "Preparations for the Commitment of Parachute and 
Other Airborne Units in the Projected Invasion of Jfelta," 
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combined planning staff fmctioned smoothly. In developing the opera­
tional plan for the capture of Malta, General Student benefited from his 
previous experience on Crete. 
In the Cretan operation^ Student had favored "oil spot tactics^" 
a random dispersal of parachute and airborne troops in different areas 
without a definite point of concentration. This technique, however, had 
nearly proven disastrous for the German airborne unitsFor the 
capture of Malta, Student intended to employ the Italo^Gernaan forces in 
a concentration of strength, a Schwerpunkt. at one or two points. From 
these bastions the entire island would be secured. 
Student envisaged an operational plan which would include a 
parachute assault to capture the southern heists of the island, pre­
ceded by a massive air raid against tfalta's airfields and anti-aircraft 
batteries,Because of the rugged terrain and steep cliffs on this 
part of the island. Student expected that the British defenders waoM be 
taken by surprise. After securing the southern heights, the Italo-
German assault force would advance to the airfields at Luqa and Hal Far. 
Student's plan to attack from the south would bypass the Victoria lines, 
the British defense perimeter guarding the north and west approaches to 
Valetta.^^ With the successful capture of Malta's airfields, the 
gliders could land safely and discharge their cargo of men and supplies. 
Student was aware of the difficulties in the proposed commitment 
3Sanson W. BaJ.dwin, Battles Lost and Won (New York: Avon Books, 
1968), lk-3, 
^^Eesselrlng, A Soldier's Record. 14$. 
3'^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 19^. 
of parachute and airborne troops, especially since the parachute forces 
would have to jump in a daylight attack, as the Italians were not 
trained for a ni^t jump.^^ The gliders were an added problem. In 
reply to his commanding general ' s query about the method of approach. 
General Conrad stated that as soon as the attack on the air bases ended, 
the airborne glider units, towed by EE-Ills and holding to a precisely 
calculated timetable, would come out of the sun from a point southeast 
of Malta, In case a smcks screen should cover the island, he added, 
special reconnaissance aircraft. Pioneers, would mark an approach line 
on the water by means of floating smoke markers.39 
General Student intended that the amphibiouB attack would be 
launched at ni^t against the eastern coast of Malta, south of Taletta, 
A daylight parachute attack, simultaneous with the landing on the 
southern coast, would secure beachheads for the Italian forces. The 
first amphibious wave of 8,300 men would be accompanied by artillery and 
tanks and followed by further transport and supply shipsThe Axis 
plan included a diversionary attack by Italian naval forces against the 
British defensive positions along the bay of Marsa Scirocco, The 
Italian Navy would also bombard British coastal positions and interpose 
itself between the Invaders and the expected intervention by the British 
fleet, 
3®Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 194. 
^^conrad, "Preparations for the Commitment of Parachute and 
Other Airborne Units in the Capture of Malta." 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 19^. 
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The main objective of the invasion force would he Valetta. 
Student expected that a ten-day campaign would he sufficient to capture 
kp 
the island. Although he expected that Malta would he more heavily 
defended than Crete had heen. Operation Herkules was more carefully 
planned, and considerably more forces assigned to its success, than the 
Luftwaffe's previous airborne raid.^^ 
In the spring of lSk2 British Army and Air Forces on Malta 
numbered approximately 30,000. Althou^ Student expected "fanatical 
resistance," Britain organized its main defenses against invasion along 
static lines, with a resultant loss of mobility.The Axis staff 
concerned with the planning of Operation Herkules based its invasion 
plan on a bold and vigorous operation. By avoiding the Victoria lines, 
Student intended to capture the airfields and advance on Valetta before 
the island's defenders could react to tbs situation and effectively 
challenge the invaders» Britain depended on the natural barriers on the 
southern coast to forestall an invasion from the south. On the eastern 
coast, her defenses consisted of a series of redoubts at strategic 
points, usually lightly defended pillboxes, which if successfully 
bypassed by an invader, would be rendered Ineffective in the further 
^%eibt, "Preparations for the Capture of Malta." 
^3j«or the Cretan operation, Germany had approximately 25,000 
troops as opposed to k2,000 British Empire and Greek troops. Against 
Malta, Germany planned to employ nearly k0,000 Axle troops against 
30,000 British troops. The capture of Crete was also undertaken, without 
adequate reconnaissance or plannli^ : only one month was spent in prepa­
ration for the assualt. Flans for the capture of Malta, hoimver, had 
been under study for at least a year» 
T. Ollohrlst, Malta Strikes Back (Aldtrihots Gat® 
Polden Ltd., 19%5), 2-3. 
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course of the battleAlthough the •western defense line could be 
shifted to protect Yaletta from a southern Invasion thrust, the British 
defenders could suffer heavy losses in a daytime movement along Malta's 
few primary transport routes if the Luftwaffe, as expected, dominated 
the sky. 
The Axis planners depended on the availability of the Luftwaffe 
to achieve aerial domination over Malta for the success of the operation» 
However, as Student and Commando Supremo expected "that preparations for 
Herkules would not be completed until July, they offered no objection •to 
the temporary transfer of Luftwaffe units to North Africa in support of 
the Afrlka Ki?rpe, In conjunction wi'th Hie timetable reached at Berch-
tesgaden, and the Italian General Staff agreed that Operation 
Herkules would commence during the July full moon period, or at •the 
latest, by the middle of August.^^ Meanwhile, Rommel's offensive would 
begin. 
The 0„K,W, directive of 5 May 19^2 -fco General Rommel affirmed 
the decisions made at the Axis conference » Rommel would launch his 
offensive. Operation Aida, no later than the beginning of June»^^^ 
Rommel approved of the Axis timetable, and although he considered It 
unfortunate that Malta could not be captured first, the attack of the 
Afrlka Korps could not be delayed» He believed that if the 8th Army 
recaptured the Cyrenalcan airfields, the British could again jeopardize 
^^Gllchrist, Malta Strikes Back. 2-3. 
^^lllgruber, ed», K.T.B. des 0„g.W., 102„ 
^Tibld. 
-77-
the central Mediterranean convoy route and eniploy the Royal Air Force to 
lift 
relieve the pressure on Malta, 
German estimation of British intentions in April and May 19^2 
was correct. Prime Minister Churchill planned for a major British 
offensive in late spring to recapture Cyrenaica for the primary purpose 
of relieving the German air attack on Malta. Churchill emphasized to 
General Auchlnleck the British government's determination to hold Bfeltas 
The Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee, and the War Cabinet have 
again considered the whole position. We are determined that Malta 
shaH not he allowed to fall without a "battle "being fought "by your 
whole army for its retention.^9 
Churchill undertook a more direct measure to relieve the 
beleaguered fortress when he once again employed the U,8. aircraft 
carrier Wasp to ferry aircraft to Malta,On 9 May, 6o Spitfires 
launched from the Wasp landed without challenge on Malta's airfields. 
Determined not to repeat the errors of the previous ferry operation from 
the Wasp, the British ground crews immediately refueled the aircraft as 
they landed. Within minutes the Spitfires returned to the skies over 
the island and awaited the expected appearance of the Luftwaffe.^^ Only 
a few Axis aircraft raided the Island on the evening of 9 May, however, 
and there were few losses on either side, 
%̂eaklii. The Brutal Friendship. 18, 
^̂ Churchill to General Auchlnleck, 10 May 19̂ 2, in ChurchîU, 
The Hinge of Fate. 269. 
5%hurchlll, The Hinge of Fate. 267, Spitfires had "been, flowm 
in to Malta from the British carrier Êaale In April, "but du® to h@r 
the Eagle could ferry only I6 at a tim, and in May wai undergoing 
repaire, 
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Although the arrival of the Spitfires meant a significant 
increase in British defensive strength on Malta, it also meant an 
increased demand for military supplies » For this reason^ the British 
minelayer Welshman, reconditioned as a supply ship "because of its speed, 
sailed from Gibraltar to Malta with a vital cargo of war material. The 
British Admiralty scheduled the supply ship's arrival to coincide with 
the arrival of the Spitfires, On 10 May the Welshman fought its way 
throu^ to Valetta, with British aircraft from Malta covering the final 
stage of the journey, and delivered much-needed cargo of anti-aircraft 
ammunition and spare parts for the Spitfires» The Luftwaffe attempt to 
intercept the Welshman met, for the first time in many lœanths, a superior 
British force, resulting in the loss of 12 German aircraft as against 
only three Spitfires 
The arrival of the Spitfires should have served as an ominous 
warning to the German war leaders concerned with the Mediterranean 
theater that Malta was far from suMued and that Britain had no inten­
tion of abandoning her Mediterranean garrison» Yet on 10 May, the day 
after the Spitfires ' arrival. Field ^ferahal Kesselring informed Hitler 
that due to t±e Luftwaffe's massive raids on Malta during the first week 
of tfa.y, the Island's military installations were completely neutralized» 
Malta, Kesselring informed the Fuehrer, no longer functioned as an air 
and naval base,^^ 
It appears that Kesselring probably Bade this premature 
^^Macintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean, 142» 
^^Kesselring, A Soldier's Becord. l4l» 
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announcement concemtag Malta 'because of the Fuehrer's impatience for 
completion of the Luftwaffe mission against the island, After receiving 
Kesselrlng's report. Hitler immediately authorized Goering, who consist­
ently opposed the attack on îfelta^ to transfer part of the 2nd Air Fleet 
5I1 
for the summer offensive on the Eastern front» Hitler also reiterated 
to Kesselrlng his intention to withdraw additional units from the attack 
on Malta if developments elsewhere should require a strengthening of 
German forceso Kesselring offered no objections to the Fuehrer's 
strategy» He expected that îfelta could be suppressed with the limited 
forces in his command 
The transfer of air units to the Russian front was followed by a 
further reduction in Kesselrlng's air coimmnd when units of the aid Air 
Fleet left Sicily to participate in Rommel's forthcoming offensive» By 
the middle of ^y 1^2 the decreasing strength of iSie Luftwaffe attack 
against Malta gave Britain the opportunity to repair the Island's 
defenses* In the air battle over the island the Spitfires took an 
increasing toll against the attackers^ particularly against the dive= 
Ijombing StukaSo^^ Britain's ability to challenge Luftwaffe supremacy in 
the central Mediterranean.^ even thou^ she was fax from achieving it for 
herself^ caused concern in OoKoWo headquarters, 
Hitler's attitude toward Operation Herkales^, to which he had 
given his "final" approval only a few weeks before^ expressed a growing 
^Sifarlimont^ Inaide Hitler's Headauartei^. 236= 37« 
55K©sselring^ A Soldier's Record. l4l. 
Fo C, Fuller, The Second World War 1939=%5. A Strategical 
and dkctlcal History (lew York: Dually SJoan^ and Pearce^ 19^9)> IT'S» 
•=80= 
disenchantment with his own decision. His skeptical remarks to the 
operations staff of O.E.W, on the possibility of capturing Malta renewed 
the question of German strategy in the Mediterranean, Because a large 
German force of elite troops was already concentrated in Sicily under­
going training for Operation Herfcules, O.K.W» requested a final clarifi­
cation of Hitler's intentions» Before replying to 0„Ko¥,'s request. 
Hitler agreed to consult with the German commander of the proposed 
operation. Colonel-General Student.^? 
On 21 May Student appeared before the Fuehrer for a verbal 
report on the progress of Herkules and its chances for success» In 
reply to Hitler's questions. Student reported that he was quite satis­
fied with the preliminary preparations and was confident of a successful 
operation. But Hitler was not satisfied with Student's report, for it 
was in opposition to his own views,̂ 8 At a meeting between Hitler and 
OeKoWo later that same day. Field Marshal Eeltel and the operations 
staff of 0,K,W, supported Student's view that Operation Herkules should 
be carried out as planned. General Jodl, Chief of Operations 
Staff, reviewed the strategic reasons for captoring Ifelta that had 
resulted in German conmltment to the operation at Berchtesgaden, But 
Hitler disregarded the opinion of 0,K»¥, and advanced a new series of 
arguments why Germany should not attempt the capture of Malta.59 
General Walter Warlimont, the head of Section L of O.K,W,'s 
^^Warllmoat, Inside Hitler's Headquarters. 237. 
5%,iddell Hart, The German Generals %.lk. l6l„ 
59warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters. 237® 
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operational staff,recorded the Fuehrer's argument: 
that once Eommel had reached the Libyan-Egyptian frontier a^in, 
supplies for North Africa could he routed past Malta to Tohrukj that 
we had no need of Malta and should therefore merely prepare for the 
landing operation "in theory" so as to throw dust in the eyes of the 
Italians 
Unprepared for Hitler's change of mind. General Jodl could offer ik) 
alternate argument, and Operation Herkules, at least temporarily, was 
shelvedo Hitler ordered, however, that the German troops assigaed to 
the project were to remain in southern Italy and that preparations were 
6P 
to continue on paper» Mussolini and Coimando SuprenK> were not 
informed of the Fuehrer's decision regarding Jfalta. 
Hitler "based his strategy concerning îfalta and the transporta­
tion of supplies to Lihya, as expressed at the conference with Student 
and OoK.Wo, on the outcome of the desert can^aign in Worth Africa, He 
reverted to his earlier view that Malta could he "bypassed and that 
capture of the island would "be unnecessaiy if the Axis held all of 
Cyrenaica» Thus, German strate©- toward Malta at the time of the Afrika 
Kbrps' summer offensive depended upon Rommel's success in driving the 
British Amjy beyond the Libyan-Egyptian border and capturing Tobruk» 
Eommel did both. 
^%arlimont headed Section L until 1944» He was immediately 
subordinate to Jodl* 
^%arlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters. 237* 
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CHAPTEE V 
"THE HOUE OF DECISION" 
In accordance with the decisions reached at Berchtesgaden on 30 
April 194-2; the German and Italian General Staffs intended that the 
Afrika Eorps' stumer offensive would be a "spoiling attack" with limited 
objectives. The primary purpose of the attack would be to offset 
British preparations for an offensive by the 8th Anqy against Eommel's 
position at the Gazala-Bir Sacheim line west of Tobruko^ O.E.W, and 
Commndo Supremo expected a campaign of approximately three weeks^ in 
which Tobruk would be the main objective. With the conclusion of the 
desert campaign^ the major Luftwaffe support would be transferred from 
North Africa to Sicily for implementation of Operation Herkules—the 
capture of Malta,^ 
During the period of lAie massive air raids on îfelta, from 
January to the beginning of Jfeiy I9I1.2, a steadily Increasing, almost 
uninterrupted flow of Axis supplies had arrived In Libya» The success­
ful neutralization of the island's offensive capability had allowed the 
Afrika Korps to amass a month's supply quota, the largest stockpile of 
supplies received by the Italo-German forces during the North African 
^he Gazala-Bir Sacheim line had been the front for the opposing 
armies since Eommel's January counteroffenslve, 
%lllgruber, ed„, E.T.B. des O.E.W.. 101-02, 
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campaigio Supermarînaj, with the cooperation of the German Naval Staff 
In Borne; had partially solved the problem of transporting supplies to 
the front at Gazala "by Improvements in the unloading capacities at 
Benghazi and Dema.^ Althou^ Eoramel's supply base appeared adequate 
for a limited offensive^ his success would depend upon a rapid defeat of 
the enemy forces » Both Rommel and his superiors recognized that a 
"battle of attrition could prove disastrous for the Afrika KorpSo 
On 26 îfey 1942 the Afrika Korps launched its desert offensive 
against the British at Gazala. Rommel began the first stage of the 
attack with his favorite gambit--a feint at the center of the British 
lines and a flanking movement to the south in an attempt to roU up the 
enemy's flank "before driving into the interior British defenses»^ 
Althou^ Rommel's initial attack was only partially successfulthe 
British counterattack failed^, and on 10 June the Afrika Eorps captured 
Bir Bacheim, the southern redoubt of the British defensive perimeter. 
Having gained the initiative in the attack, Rommel proceeded to exploit 
it» On 16 June the German attack forced the British Army to a"bandon El 
Adem, the last strongpoint before Tobruk® Encircling the fortress, the 
Afrika Kbrps drove the 8th Army to the Egyptian border « Wi-fâi the 
British Army routed from Cyrenaica, Rommel paused and regrouped his 
forces before launching his attack on the Tobruk garrison,^ From Rome, 
3welchold, Axis Naval Policy. 82, In April l9i|-2 only 2,400 tons 
of stores had been unloaded at Dema, In îfey the amount rose to 7,500 
tons and in June reached 11,000 tons. Similar improvements were made at 
Benghazi. 
^Michael Carver, Tobruk (Philadelphia; Dufour Editions, 1964), I76. 
%Wd., 210-27, 
however^ came the warning that the capture of Totruk^ althou^ a worthy 
prize, must not "become an extmded campaign. Commando Supremo intended 
to carry out the origiml Axis timsta'ble; which scheduled the capture of 
ffeilta as the next objective for the AjcIs»^ 
ÎSie Italian General Staff had not "been informed of Hitler's 
intention to cancel, or at least to postpone^ Operation Eerkules if 
Eonmiel succeeded in capturing To'bruk, Hitler's expectation that Malta 
could "be "bypassed once the Axis held all of Cyrenaiea was not shared by 
the Duce and Commando Supremo. Mussolini and General Cavallero were not 
satisfied wl#i Field îfeirshal Késselrlng's announcement in May that Malta 
was eliminated as an enemy air and naval base. The Italians believed, 
on the basis of past experience, that not until the Axis captured the 
island would the Axis convoy route to Korth Africa be secured» They 
viewed with alarm the reduction of Luftwaffe strength in Sicily for duty 
on the Eastern front, and were adamant that the air forces allocated for 
the Wor#i African offensive wouM be on a temporary basis.The Duce 
and the Italian General Staff were B»re correct in their assessment of 
the strategic situation in the central Mediterranean than their Geman 
partner, as proven by continued British attempts to reinforce ffelta, 
The offensive capability of the island, which the Luftwaffe 
raids had nearly destroyed at tibe end of April, began to increase with 
the arrival of Spitfire aircraft ferried from the Wasp and other air­
craft carriers » During tey and June a total of I96 aircraft reached the 
^intelen, Mussolini als Bimdeagenosse » I68, 
Tibid.. 166-67. 
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islaiïdo The reduction of the Luftwaffe forces based on Sicily lessened 
the air supremacy fOMarly achieved by 'tiie 2ad Air Fleet and encouraged 
the British to attempt sending another convoy through to the island in 
June»® By reinforcing Malta, Britain hoped to strike at the weakest 
link in Eommel's chain of operations»»th© Axis supply route to North 
Africa» 
To provide the greatest chance for success, the British Admi­
ralty decided to sead two simultaneous convoys from Gibraltar and 
Alexandria to MaltaOn 12 and 13 June the respective convoys sailedo 
The westward convoy. Operation Harpoon, which included 11 merchant ships, 
underwent heavy German air and submrine attack, and with the threat of 
intervention by Iflie Italleua Navy, was forced to return to Alexandria o 
The eastward bound convoy. Operation Vigorous, included six merchant 
ships heavily escorted by units of the te'itish fleet. After a hard-
10 
fought voyage, only two of ttie cargo ships reached Valetta. 
The June convoy appeared to be a disastrous failure for the 
British in their atten̂ t to provide succor for the Malta garrison. Of 
the 17 merchant ships which had sailed in the dual convoys, only two had 
reached the island « Axis air power accounted for the greatest British 
losses, which included the sinking of six merchant shipŝ  four destroy­
ers, one cruiser, and the damaging of many other merchant and naval 
vessels. In the air battle tiae Luftwaffe had lost lÀ alroraft, while 
Û 
ChiUfohill, The Hinge of Fate. 263, 
9lbid. 
^̂ Welchold, Axis Naval Polls v. 83= 8% « The two ships d§liv®3?©4 
15,000 tons of suppll@®e 
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11 
the Eegla Aeromutlca had lost P2o 
But althou^ Britain suffered high losses in, the June convoy^ 
she had achieved a strategic vie tory « Kie supplies ttiat had reached the 
island in the two successful merchant ships eimtled îfelta to recover 
furHier its offensive aad defensive posture» The successful penetration 
of the Sicilian Straits, even at heavy cost, had proven once again that 
Britain, had no intention of surrendering her position in the central 
Mediterranean„ Goimnando Supremo recognized the danger to Axis efforts 
in. Gyrenaica if Malta-based forces increased the attacks on Axis ship­
ping, and their fears were shared by the German laval Staffs 
Although Hitler on 21 May had indicated his intention to abandon 
the plan to capture Malta^ the GeMoan laval Staff, headed by Admiral 
Eaeder, continued to press for Operation Eerkules » Eaeder did not 
consider the Fuehrer's earlier decision as irrevocable, and by a 
carefully prepared argument he hoped to win Hitler's approval again for 
an Axis invasicm of the island Admiral Eaeder began by reeraphasizing 
the importance of capturing îfelta to the land battle in North Africa. 
Hitler replied that he was aware of the importence of capturing the 
island, but that he did not believe that the allocation of German forces 
to the task was feasible while Gemmny was coimîd.tted to the Eastern fronto 
The Fuehrer considered #at an extensive commitment of the Wehrmacht, 
beyond those forces that had already been assigned to the operation, 
would be necessary to insure success„ Hitler was especially reluctant 
^Weichold, Axis laval Policy. 84» 
^%tiehrer Conferences. I5 June 19%2, 95 = 
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to transfer the necessary transport aircraft for Operation Herkules from 
duty in the East. He also expressed his doubt as to the ability of the 
Italian troops to carry out such a difficult assignment, while the 
cooperation of the Italian Wavy he considered dubious at best.^3 
Admiral Eaeder and his staff admitted that the capture of Malta 
would be a difficult operation^ but they advised the Fuehrer that from a 
naval point of view^ Operation Herlailes appeared both feasible and 
necessary for the future conduct of the Mediterranean war. Admiral 
Eaeder sou^t to remove Hitler's doubts by presenting an alternate 
argument on the Italian role in the proposed undertaking. Eaeder 
expected tîmt the transfer of German air transport units from the 
Eastern front would be unnecessary, as Italian air units were available 
and appeared adequate for the task. The naval chief added that if the 
Italian troops intended for the mission were under the overall direction 
of German coMoanders, an exceptional performance could be expected. 
Although Eaeder shared Hitler's doubt as to the aggressiveness of the 
Italian Wavy in supporting the invasion, he advised the Fuehrer that in 
the opinion of the Naval Staff the British Navy would not risk its 
capital ships, battleships, and heavy cruisers in the narrow waters of 
the Sicilian Straits to oppose an Axis invasion of tfelta. Eaeder 
believed that the danger of aerial attack from Sicilian-based aircraft 
would dissuade such an intervention by the capital ships of the Mediter­
ranean fleet. Therefore, Eaeder argued, the Italian Navy would not have 
to ei#loy its battleships, as Supermarina feared, but merely hold them 
^^uehrer Conferences. I5 June 1942, 87. 
-88-
în reserve 
Eaeder, however, did not dismiss the threat of British destroy­
ers, aircraft carriers, and light cruisers from "both Gibraltar and 
Alexandria in challenging the Axis invaders» But if the Luftwaffe could 
intercept the British naval forces, Eaeder argued, the tmnsportatlon of 
men and supplies to the island hy sea, once the bridgehead had been 
established, did not appear too difficult a task» In summary of his 
report to the Fuehrer on the naval view concerning Operation Herkules, 
Eaeder concluded; 
The operation is difficult and risky. However in the long run the 
Naval Staff considers it still more risky not to carry out the 
operation» From the standpoint of strategy, the Naval Staff consid­
ers the occupation of Malta as an absolute necessity „ . „ to 
continue shipping supplies to Africa, to protect our position in 
North Africa, and later hope to launch em attack against Suez. And 
we must keep in mind that conditions for taking tfelta will in all 
probability never again be as favorable as they are this summer,^5 
Hitler, however, did not accept the advice of his Naval Staff, 
Instead, he offered his favorite solution to the Axis convoy problem; 
bypassing Malta and routing the convoys to Cyrenaican ports via Crete, 
Hitler expressed his belief to Eaeder that this route would be especially 
successful if Eoimnel succeeded In capturing Tobruk. !Qie Fuehrer also 
reiterated his impression that perhaps the enemy should be allowed to 
retain Malta, since British attenç)ts to supply the island presented the 
Luftwaffe an exceptional opportunity to inflict considerable losses on 
British merchant ships and their naval escorts « Hitler then resurrected 
the idea of capturing the island by announcing that "once Jfelta has been 
^^tFuehrer Conferences. I5 June 194^2, 95• 
l^Ibid.. 95-96, 
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"bled white "by the continuotis air raids and the total blocMde we co-old 
risk the attack® 
An attempt to examine the Fuehrer's attitude concerning Malta as 
expressed at "ttie conference with Admiral Raeder on I5 June 19^2 is a 
frustrating endeavor « At the beginning of the conference. Hitler 
acknowledged the ingortance of capt-uring the island, tut offered doubt 
as to the availability of German forces for the operation and his 
distrust of Italian cooperation» After listening to an ©xtœded argu­
ment to the contrary, as presented by Admiral Raeder, the Fuehrer then 
Indicated that the capture of the island was unnecessary, that it could 
be bypassed, and that It even served a useful purpose as a target for 
the Luftwaffe attack on British shipping, Wiis reasoning was then 
followed by Hitler's pronouncement that the Axis might capture the 
Island after aU once ̂ Ita had been "bled white" by Luftwaffe air raids. 
If Hitler intended once a^ln to inaugurate the mass air raids 
necessary to neutralize îfeilta prior to its invasion by the Axis, then 
the Luftwaffe forces temporarily assigned to Korth Africa would have to 
be returned to Sicily upon conclusion of the Cyrenalcan offensive» This 
was the plan agreed upon by the Axis leaders at Berchtesgaden on 30 
April, denounced by the Fuehrer on 21 May, and the subject of the mixed 
pro and con argument on I5 June» It appears tkat Hitler's Intention was 
to await the outcome of Rommel's desert campaigi, particularly concern­
ing Tobruk, before reaching another "filial" decision. 
On 20 June Rommel launched his attack on Tobruk» Seven months 
^%uehrer Conferences. I5 June 19^2, 87. 
-^0" 
before^ capture of the fortress had eluded him^ "but in the summer of 
19^2 the Afrlka Kbrps had massive Luftwaffe aid and sufficient logistic 
cal support to complete the mission. After brief but fierce resistance^ 
the garrison capitulated on 21 June .^7 pomiel captured over 30,000 
British troops at Tobruk and a vast store of supplies. With the road to 
Egypt apparently open and with the supplies captured at Tobruk, Rommel 
prepared to conttnue his offensive^ destroy the retreating British Army, 
and secure Egypt for the Axis. He disregarded the previous Axis plan, 
which called for a halt after capturing Tobruk for implementation of 
Operation Herkules, and ignoring the orders of his Italian superiors, he 
advanced the Afrika Korps toward the Egyptian border. For authorization 
T A 
of his drive into Egypt, Rommel appealed directly to the Fuehrer® 
The surrender of Tobruk had significant meaning for the war in 
North Africa aM brought into the open the divergent strategic views of 
the Axis allieso Both Axis leaders viewed the victory of the Afrika 
Kbrps as a turning point in the desert campaigi, but î&issolini, showing 
the cautious approach which always characterized the Italian war effort, 
hoped to secure what had already been won, while Hitler saw the fall of 
Tobruk as the signal for an aU-out effort to destroy completely the 
British forces in North Africa. 
On the day that Tobruk surrendered, Mussolini wrote to Hitler 
^^Carver, Tobruk. 248. 
^^Weichold, Axis Naval Policy. 86. Rommel's immediate superior 
in North Africa was General Bastico. His chain of conmand included 
General Cavallero and the Duce, but Rommel often bypassed his Italian 
superiors in favor of O.K,¥. and the Fuehrer» Rommel did not wait for 
confirmation of his intentions from Hitler but continued operations on 
his own responsibility. 
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that Operation Herkules must be the next objective for the Axis Mediter­
ranean forces. The Duce emphasized to Hitler that the elimination of 
Malta as an offensive "base against Italian shipping was the key to the 
Itelian strategic plan in the Mediterranean war. Mussolini informed the 
Fuehrer that he intended to withdraw air units from North Africa for the 
assault on ffelta, which ttie Duce believed should be undertaken In July 
or at the latest in August» Othen^ise^ he wrote, because weather condi­
tion were suitable only during the summer months, the operation would 
have to be postponed until 19^1-3; with serious consequences for Axis 
hopes on the Mediterranean front. The Duce concluded his remarks con­
cerning fîfelta to the Fuehrer: 
Besides solving the problem of Mediterranean traffic, the operation 
against ïfelta would allow us to dispose freely once more of our air 
forces, which today are tied to the Mediterranean sector and will 
remain so as long as the enemy has Malta. The freeing of the air 
forces . o . would mean that our freedom of manoeuvre would be 
restored--a factor of prime importance for victoiy.^S 
The following day, 22 June, without waiting for the Fuehrer's 
permission and at the urging of General Cavallero, Mussolini ordered 
20 
Field Marshal Eoimnel not to advance beyond the Egyptian border. The 
Duce also ordered the immediate withdrawal of several air units from 
North Africa to Sicily. Informed of the Duce's order, Eomrael stated to 
General Bastico that. In spite of Commando Supremo's judgment, he 
l9Mussolini to Hitler, 21 June 19^2, quoted in Deakin, The 
Brutal Friendship. 18. 
^^Immediately after the capture of Tobruk, Hitler promoted 
General Eommel to the rank of Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschal). 
Shortly thereafter the Duce promoted General Cavallero to the rank of 
Marshal in order for the head of Commando Supremo to keep pace with his 
German subordinate. 
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intended to continue his advance "beyond the Egyptian border and drive to 
the Persian GulfAt the same time that Eommel disobeyed his Italian 
superiors. General von Rintelen Infonned Commando Supremo that he had 
pp 
received orders from O.K.W. supporting Eommel's intentions. 
With the rapid and successful advance of the Afrlka Korps in 
North Africa and the capture of TobruJc, the German Supreme Command was 
not inclined to follow the cautious, if not regressive, policy of 
Commando Supremo. On the contrary, O.K,V., like Eommel, intended to 
exploit the recent gains of the Cyrenaican offensive as far as possible» 
From Eonmel's report on the situation, it appeared to 0,K,W, that the 
rout of the British Army from Cyrenaica could be continued to the Nile. 
The German General Staff needed no prompting from the Fuehrer to 
disregard previous Axis plans for Eommel to stand on the defensive while 
the Axis reorganized its forces for the capture of Malta, Despite the 
warnings from Field Marshal Kesselring, the proposed invasion of the 
island once again faded into the background of German planning. 
Eommel's request to the Fuehrer for permission to complete the 
destruction of -ttie British 8th Army allowed Hitler to revert to his 
decision of 21 May that Operation Herkules was unnecessary for the 
success of future Mediterranean strategy. To insure Italian cooperation 
with what Hitler regarded as a dramatic turn of events, the Fuehrer 
wrote to Mjssolinl outlining the consequences of the Afrika Kbrps ' 
^^intelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. I69. 
^^Ibid. General Enno von Eintèlen was the military attache and 
Genmn general at the headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces in Eome, 
23warlimont, "The Decision in the Mediterranean," I9I. 
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recent success and. his views on future Mediterranean operations, 
Eeferring to "the hour of decision" and without even màationing Malta, 
Hitler wrote that since the British 8th Army was practically destroyed, 
the main military objective of the Axis must be to exploit the decisive 
events in North Africa as totally and rapidly as possible. He empha­
sized to the Duce that the situation required a total effort to continue 
the drive into Egypt, If the Axis hesitated. Hitler warned, the present 
favorable circumstances could change radically to the disadvantage of 
the Italo-German war effort» "Destii^ has offered us a chance which 
ph 
win not be repeated in the same theater of war." 
Hitler sou^t to overcome the Duce *8 fears concerning the prob­
lem of transporting supplies to support the North African offensive. 
The capture of Tobruk with its port installations nearly intact, he 
wrote, presented Italy with an excellent harbor for Axis convoys. 
Hitler added that a railroad from the port ran to the Egyptian border, 
allowing the rapid transfer of supplies to the front 
The Fuehrer also presented to Mussolini his views on the 
consequences of a British defeat in Egypt, Such a victory. Hitler 
concluded, would be of worldwide importance, and if the drive through 
Egypt coincided with Germany's Eastern offensive into the Caucasus, It 
could bring about the collapse of the British Empire in the Middle East, 
Hitler ended his letter to the Duce with a personal and dramatic plea 
for total Italian cooperations 
^^itler to Mussolini, 23 June 19^2, quoted in Deakln, The 
Brutal Friendship. 19. 
25lbld. 
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Therefore Duce, if in this historic hour, which will not "be repeated, 
I can give you a piece of advice from my eager heart, it would be: 
Order operations to "be continued until the British forces are com­
pletely annihilated. . , , The goddess of fortune passes only mce 
close to warriors in "battle. Anyone who does not grasp her at that 
moment can very often never touch her again.26 
Mussolini could not resist the Fuehrer's optimistic outlook, 
The Duce, who preferred the optimism of a grand strategy to the reali­
ties of tactical weakness, quickly gave his agreement to Hitler's 
grandiose plans. Caught up in the excitement of the moment, the Duce 
preferred to trust in Hitler's judgment rather than heed the warnings of 
Commando Supremo and Field Marshal Eesselring that the supply situation 
was inadequate for an extended offensive across the Egyptian desert 
On 2h June Marshal Cavallero ordered postponement of Operation 
Herkules until the "beginning of September, "but few actually "believed the 
invasion would "be undertaken at that time. Hitler and O.K.VT, considered 
that if the Afrika Korps advanced to the Nile, Malta wuld be isolated 
far behind the front lines and its capture by the Axis would thus "be 
unnecessaiy. In June 19^2 Hitler based his strategy concerning 
Britain's position in the Mediterranean and Middle East, as indicated in 
his letter to Mussolini, not only on Rommel's desert offensive but also 
on the success of the summer offensive into the Caucasus.^® 
Hitler conceived of a "Great Plan" to smash the British forces 
in the Mediterranean and Middle East, The Fuehrer envisaged a giant 
pincer movement, the western arm of which would be Rommel's advance 
^%itler to Mussolini, 23 June 19^2, quoted in Deakin, The 
Brutal Friendship» 19» 
^^Eesselring, A Soldier's Record. 149=50. 
^^Deakln, The Brutal Friendship. 21. 
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through Egypt to Suez, while the eastern, arm would he an advance "by the 
German Amy out of the Caucasus into the Middle East. Hitler "believed 
that once poised on the Anatolian highlands, the German Army would not 
be denied passage hy the Turkish government « Suez, then, could te taken 
both from the east and from the west. And the joining of these two 
aimies could destroy Britain's entire in the Middle East, an event that 
29 
Hitler "believed would "be welcomed In the Arab world. 
This, then, was Hitler's "Great Plan" in the summer of 19^2, a 
strategy that allowed him to Ignore the central Mediterranean and con­
centrate his attention on the expected link-up of the German armies at 
Suez, The eastern phase of the "Great Plan" depended on ttie capture of 
Stalingrad and the drive through the Caucasus, The western phase relied 
on Pommel's success at El Alamein, the last stronghold before the Nile 
delta. 
With the supplies captured at Tobruk, Field tfershal Rommel was 
confident of reaching the Nile. Althou^ he realized that it was a 
gamble, it was an Irresistable one and, besides, as military commander 
in the field, Rommel considered the pursuit and destruction of the enemy 
a tactical necessity.On 22 June the Afrlka Korps captured Bardia; 
Solium fell to the German drive on 23 June; and on 28 June Mersa Matruh 
capitulated. But on 30 June the British defensive line at El Alamein, 
^^Puehrer's Directive Ho« 32, 11 June 19^1. Documents on German 
Foreign Policy. Ser, D, XII, Doc, No, 617; 1014. Also, conversation 
between the Fuehrer and tte Duce, 29 April 19^2. The Department of State 
Bulletin. X7, Wo, 367 (Ih July 19^6), 61-62. 
3®Liddell Hart, The Rommal Papers. 233» 
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the last fortress before Alexandria, halted Rommel's drive. 
The rapidity of Eommel's advance into Egypt removed the doubts 
of those who had previously advocated halting the Afrika Eorps at Tobruk 
and undertaking Operation Herkules, Optimism was hî  at O.K.W» head-
guarterŝ  and the German General Staff expected the imminent destruction 
of the 8th Army. Commando Supremo also was confident of wresting Egypt 
from the British, and at the end of June the Duce arrived in Libya with 
the Sword of Islam, preparatory to riding through the streets of Cairo 
as the great conqueror he so often dreamed of being.Even Field 
Marshal Kesselring gave his support to an extended drive by the Afrika 
Eorps and promised Eommel that the Luftwaffe would ferry troops and 
supplies from Sicily to the Worth African front at El Alamein,̂  ̂
The Afrika Eorps renewed its attack on 1 July, but stiff British 
resistance repelled the assault. For two days the battle went from 
attack to counterattack, until on 3 July Bommel broke off tti© engagement 
and ordered the Afrika Eoî s to assume defensive positions Chice 
again, as so often happened in the North African war, the campaign 
settled into a logistical struggle between the opposing armies» Without 
adequate supplies, the position of the Afrika Eorps would be untenable » 
The three-day battle at El Alameln dangerously reduced Rommel's stock­
pile of supplies, and the situation which only a week previously had 
Bljfextienssen, Hitler and His Admlraia. I30. 
^̂ Rlntelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. I72, 
33̂ eichold, Axis Naval Policy. 90® 
^̂ iddéll Hart, The Rommel Papers. 248, 
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appeared so favorable again renewed the doubts of certain success. 
Altiiou^ troops and a few supplies could be transported by air 
to the Worth African I'ront^ the bulk of the required stores had to be 
brought by sea. During July, however, the situation at sea steadily ' 
deteriorated for the Axis, The ports of Benghazi^ Derm and even Tobnik 
lay far behind the front at El Alamein» Axis use of the port of Mersa 
Ifetruh, which had few defenses, was jeopardized by frequent attacks from 
British surface ships based at Alexandria and SueZo^^ The railroad from 
Tobruk also underwent constant British air attack and further diminished 
the amount of supplies reaching the Afrika KorpSo^^ British activities 
during July against the supply line of the Afrika Eorps from Egyptian 
bases east of El Alamein were matched by renewed efforts from the once 
impotent air and submarine base at Malta, 
The decision to postpone the capture of tW.ta in favor of the 
Afrika Eorps ' advance into Egypt was taken with the assurance of Field 
Marshal Eesselring that Malta could be suppressed with the limited 
forces at his conmiand. But British air reinforcements to Malta during 
May and June 19^2 again posed a threat to Axis convoys in the central 
Mediterranean, while reconnaissance aircraft from the island kept close 
watch on Italian shipping bound for Cyrenaica via Greece and Crete. 
This renewed activity forced the Luftwaffe to undertake once more the 
35weichold, Axis Naval Policy. 92. The British Navy temporarily 
moved the fleet from Alexandria to Suez when Pommel first reached El 
Alamein. During the period from 11 to 22 July British naval forces made 
five raids at Mersa Matruh and sank three supply ships, 
3^CbM, On 17 July a British air raid destroyed the Luftwaffe 
oil depot at Tobruk. 
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neutrallzation of Malta» 
The summer air offensive against Malta, the so-called "Malta 
Blitz," "began on July. Eeichsmarschal Goering personally assured the 
Fuehrer that the air attack could once a^in eliminate the island as a 
British air base. The Luftwaffe forces available to Field tfershal 
Kesselring for the task, however, were not equal to the number employed 
in the previous concentrated attacks against the island.During July, 
59 additional British aricraft arrived at the Island, bringing the total 
at the end of the month to nearly 250,^® In the first month of the 
"Malta Blitz" the Luftwaffe dropped over 700 tons of "bombs on the island 
but at the cost of 65 aircraft, while the British lost 36 planes in the 
air with 17 more destroyed on the ground.The Axis failure to achieve 
definite air superiority over the island permitted the return of the 
10th Submarine Fleet to Valet ta on 20 July, substantially Increasing the 
threat to Axis shipping.^® Meanwhile, Pommel remained frustrated "in his 
attempt to break through the British lines at. El Alameln, 
Field Marshal Rommel realized that he was being outsupplled by 
the British, who were secure in their supply line to Cairo and Alexan­
dria, while the supplies promised to him by Commando Supremo and 
^^eichold. Axis Naval Policy. 9O-9I. The Luftwaffe had 301 
operational aircraft available at the beginning of July, as compared 
with 4l8 at the beginning of April. 
^^bid., 91. This figure includes all types of aircraft. 
British sources acknowledge only 80 operational fighters. 
39Macintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean. I65, 
^°Ibld. 
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Eesselrîng fell far "below the requirements of the Afrika Korps,^^ The 
efforts of the Italo-German forces in repulsing the increased British 
attacks required an increase in "both men and supplies. In place of the 
requested supply increase, Eommel received more assurances from his 
superiors. He did receive, however, over 35,000 additional troops 
during July and August—the same troops who for the last several manths 
had "been in training for Operation Eerkules,^^ 
The transfer of the forces intended for the capture of Malta 
forced the final cancellation of Axis plans to capture the island with 
serious consequences for the Mediterranean war. The fortunes of the 
seesaw "battle in the Worth African desert campaign had very often In the 
past two years teen directly related to the ability of the Axis to 
neutralize the British forces on Malta. This was not pure chance "but 
rather reflected the overall strategic situation in the Mediterranean 
theater of war, "Victory in Worth Africa depended upon motility, 
motility depended upon supplies, and supplies, of course, depended upon 
the safe arrival of Axis convoys from Italy, Britain's supply "bases at 
Alexandria and Cairo depended on her supply lines to Britain and North 
America via the Suez Canal, and although it was many thousands of miles 
longer than the Axis convoy route across the Medl terranëan, the supply 
line was nearly unchallenged along Its entire length. But on the other 
hand, to supply )^lta, Britain faced an extremely hazardous task. 
The British government and Chiefs of Staff had long recognized 
^^Liddell Hart, Bie_^me]^_Pa£ers, 266=6%, 
^^Eesselring, A Soldier's Eecord. I50. 
-100-
Malta's unique position and the advantages of retaining the island at 
all costs. For this reason Britain had taken every opportunity to 
supply the island. Churchill considered Egypt's first line of defense 
to "be the British air and naval units at Malta. Germa# military strate­
gists, including Hitler, recognized in varying degrees the importance of 
Malta to the land campaign in North Africa, "but in the late summer of 
1942 they relied on: the "Malta Blitz" to achieve neutralization of the 
island's military capability. By August, however, the situation in the 
central Mediterranean began to shift in favor of the British. The 
British government and the Chiefs of Staff decided to attempt to secure 
this advantage by sending a heavily reinforced convoy from Gibraltar to 
MaltaBritain intended that this operation, codenamed "Pedestal," 
•would be given priority over all other demands, for they considered that 
"on the success or failure of ^fedeptal' ... would hang the fate of 
Malta and hence in all probability of the Wile Valley. 
Alerted to the British preparations to challenge once again the 
Axis in the central Mediterranean, Field Marshal Eesselring ordered a 
regrouping of all available air strength on Sicily and Sardinia for a 
45 
massive air attack on the British convoy. With the cooperation of 
Supermarina and Commando Supremo, six Italian and three German subma­
rines guarded the approach routes between the Balearic Islands and the 
^^Ohurchill, The Hinge: of Fate. 439• 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. HI, 316. 
^5Weichold, Axis Naval Policy. 93. German sources list approxi­
mately $40 German and Italian aircraft participated in the attack. 
British claim 600 to 1,000. 
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Algerian coast, while 12 other Italian submarines were positioned just 
north of Bizerte, To intercept any ships that reached the central 
Mediterranean, the Italian Navy intended to employ six cruisers and 11 
k6 
destroyers against the British forces. 
On 10 August the British convoy sailed from Gibraltar. The task 
force included 14 merchant ships and the largest naval escort ever 
assembled for a Malta convoy operation. To insure adequate air cover, 
four aircraft carriers accompanied the group 
The attack on the convoy began at noon of the secoi^d day, when 
the German submarine U-73 torpedoed and sank the aircraft carrier Eagle. 
By 12 August the convoy was within range of German and Italian aircraft, 
but in I the extended air attack of that day, Britain lost only ofie 
merchant ship and one destroyer. As the British task force approached 
the Sicilian Straits, however, the British capital ships and aircraft 
carriers turned back to Gibraltar, Britain could not risk her heavier 
ships in the confined area of the Mediterranean Narrows, and the 
kg 
merchant ships with only light escort continued on for Valetta. 
On the evening of 12 August, Italian submarines sank a merchant 
tanker and three light cruisers, considerably reducing the convoy's 
naval escort. The Luftwaffe sank two merchant ships on the same evening, 
while German and Italian E-boats sank four others. By the morning of 13 
^^eichold. Axis Naval Policy. 94. No battleships could partic­
ipate because of lack of fuel oil, 
^^flayfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. 317-18. Britain 
also created a diversionary sailing from Alexandria composed of a few 
empty merchantmen. 
319. 
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August, only six supply ships continued towaixL Malta, guarded "by two 
light cruisers and eight destroyers. British aircraft from Malta arrived 
at noon to protect the remaining ships of the convoy, altho^ugh the 
Luftwaffe recorded a final success in sinking another of the supply 
ships "before ending its attack. By the evening of 13 August, the 
remaining five merchant ships docked at Valetta,^^ 
The Axis failure to destroy entirely "Uie British effort was not 
only "because of strong British air and sea defenses but tecauae of the 
failure of Axis cooperation. The striking force of the It&lian Navy 
assembled to attack the convoy south of Pantelleria on the morning of I3 
August never participated in the "battle. Their participation required a 
screen of fighter aircraft to protect the Italian ships from Malta-tased 
aircraft. Field Msirshal Essselring, however, ordered all German and 
Italian fighter aircraft in his command to protect the "bomibers of the 
2nd Air Fleet. The Italian Naval Staff appealed to the Duce to allow 
fighter protection for the naval force, which meanwhile had already 
sailed. Mussolini decided in favor of Kesselring, and the Italian naval 
force returned to port. On the return voyage, however, a British 
suTzmarine from Malta torpedoed two of the Italian cruisers, 
The "Pedestal" convoy was the hardest fought convoy of the 
Mediterranean war. It was a test of strength in which Britain had again 
^^Playfalr, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 319-22. In 
the battle the British lost 18 aircraft in the air plus I6 lost with the 
Eagle. The Axis lost 35* The five ships delivered a mixed cargo of 
47/000 tons, 
^^eichold, Axis Naval Policy. 94-95* The two cruisers reached 
harbor but never saw action again. 
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geimbled and won. The August convoy was el so the last to be seriously-
challenged "by the Axis forces,Although the cost of supplying Malta 
had teen extremely high, there were no longer any doubts that Britain 
could retain the island. 
By August 19^2 the final attempt to neutralize Malta by air 
attack had failed. The task of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean in 
the summer of 19^2—constant attack on Malta, protection of the Nor-Wi 
African convoys, and tactical support of the Afrika Korps--proved too 
great a commitment for the limited forces available. At El A lame in 
Bommel suffered the consequences of the Luftwaffe's inability to secure 
the central Mediterranean. 
Although in July British forces sank only six per cent of the 
total supplies leaving Italy for North Africa, in August this figure 
rose to 25 per cent of the general military cargo and 4l per cent of the 
52 
fuel oil intended for the Afrika Kbrps. These figures, however, are 
even more important when one considers that each loss suffered by the 
Italian merchant fleet could not be replaced. The tonnage shipped from 
Italy during July and August was barely enough for the Afrika Korps to 
maintain its position. Any loss was therefore prohibitive. Rommel, 
aware that his military situation grew worse each day, planned to launch 
a large scale attack at the end of August against the British lines at 
El A la,me in, 
Rommel's greatest shortage, particularly for a mobile attack, 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. IH, 323. 
52ibld.. 327. 
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was fuel oil for his motorized units. Commando Supremo promised to 
alleviate this deficiency "before the Afrika Kbrps attacked "by shipping 
10,000 tons of fuel oil, half for the Panzer Army ajid half for the 
Luftwaffe, Of the seven ships which sailed for Tohruk with this cargo, 
British air and submarine attacks from Malta sank four, Eommel, 
however, believed that the battle could no longer he delayed, and on 30 
August the Afrika Iferps attacked. 
The attack of the Afrika Korps on 30 and 31 August failed; two 
days later Eommel returned to the defensive. Only 60 miles across the 
"bay lay Alexandria and the Nile, but for Eommel it remained an unreach­
able goal. The British 8th Anuy slowly amassed a tremendous stockpile 
of war material during the fall of 19^2, and General Montgomery prepared 
for a battle which Britain could not lose and the Afrika Korps could not 
win. But for Eommel the "Hour of Decision" had arrived at the end of 
August with the failure of his offensive. Only the caution of the 
British delayed the final decision. 
In reviewing the strategic decisions in the Mediterranean which 
led to the final defeat at El Alamein, Eommel attributed the blame for 
the Afrika Korps' defeat to the supply failure. Eommel believed that 
above all ïfelta should have been captured, thus securing the Worth 
African convoy route. He considered 0,K,W, chiefly responsible for this 
failure because of its consistent inattention to the needs of the Afrika 
Kbrps until the very end, when the Nile delta lay in sig^t. For 18 
months he had consistently recommended the capture of Malta to his 
^^Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. 382. 
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superiors in Berlin, but their preoccupation with the Eastern front and 
their expectation that no great accomplishments could be won in the 
North African desert caused the German Supreme Command to adopt a 
pessimistic attitude concerning the Mediterranean front until El 
Ri). 
Alaraein. 
But îfe.lta, the "unsinkable aircraft carrier," could not be 
bypassed nor suppressed, and after the initial stalemate at El Alamein, 
British air and submarine units from the central Mediterranean bastion 
complemented the efforts of the Egyptian-based forces in preventing an 
Axis victory. After the defeat in Worth Africa, Rommel wrote : 
With I4alta in our hands, the British would have had little chance of 
exercising any further control over convoy traffic in the central 
Mediterranean, Malta has the lives of many thousands of German and 
Italian soldiers on its conscience.55 
5^Llddell Hart, The Rommel Papers. I9I-92. 
55ibid.. 288-89. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing German strategy concerning one must first 
consider the Belch's concept of the overall Mediterranean war and the 
"basis for the decisions which "by the fall of I9k2 led to the defeat at 
El Alamein and eventually the loss of the entire North African littoral. 
Although O.K.W. shared in, and at times determined, German war strategy, 
as the supreme war commander Hitler must tear the ultimate responsibility 
for the decisions of the German High Command. 
Until the summer of 19k2 Hitler regarded the Mediterranean 
theater of war as no more than a sideshow in relation to the continental 
war, The southern theater of operations. Hitler decided, did not 
justify a total commitment of the Wehrmacht, and he readily agreed to 
Mussolini's concept of "parallel war" which acknowledged Italy's 
dominant role In the conduct of Mediterranean operations. Germany had 
no desire to play a major role in the area, "but "by the end of 1940 the 
Italian reverse in Greece exposed the weakness of the Italian Armed 
Forces and forced a reluctant Hitler to come to the aid of his ally. 
Although Germany was forced to accept an increasing responsibil­
ity for the formation of Mediterranean strategy and the leadership of 
operations, it was Hitler's intention to maintain the facade of Italian 
leadership in the area as long as possible. Hitler believed that 
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Mussolini's prestige as a war leader must be preserved, for without the 
personal figure of the Duce the Axis alliance would collapse. 
The prohlems of Axis cooperation were apparent once the myth of 
"parallel war" had "been shattered. When Germany entered the Mediterran­
ean war in November 1940, there existed no plans for the conduct of 
joint operations, no Axis military staff, and no "basis for mutual trust, 
a primary requisite for Implementing a Joint military effort. On the 
contrary, Germany's entrance into the Mediterranean theater of war 
Increased the mistrust between the Axis military leaders, a mistrust 
which considerably hindered the advantages of a united commitment and 
endangered the hopes for success. 
These three reasons, then--Hitler's judgment of the Mediterran­
ean as an ancillary theater, his concern for the personal prestige of 
the Duce, and the problems of Axis cooperation—explain in great part 
German Mediterranean strategy from June 19^0 to May 1941. During this 
period Germany sought to achieve limited goals and developed no grand 
strategy for the complete elimination of British forces in the area. 
Although Hitler authorized the formation of the Afrlka Korps in February 
19^1, this was a limited force with the limited objective of holding 
Libya for the Axis. It was a defensive measure to prevent a British 
victory and from which Hitler expected Ao great success. 
For the Luftwaffe units assigned to -tiie south, however. Hitler 
had an offensive assignment—the elimination of Malta as a British naval 
and air station. Hitler thus recognized the strategic importance of the 
Island, but he again sought a limited, temporary solution rather than 
the Invasion and capture of the island. Hitler's decision in the spring 
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of 1941 to invade the Balkans justified, the temporary transfer of tJie 
Luftwaffe from Sicily to Greece, but with the conclusion of Operation 
Marita the German air units in the Mediterranean received an additional 
assignment—Operation Marita, the capture of Crete. 
The German invasion of Crete has "been described as "the wrong 
"battle in the wrong place at the wrong time,"^ Certainly the capture of 
Crete was a Phyrric victory for Germany, Crete never assumed the 
strategic importance for the Mediterranean war that the proponents of 
the operation had claimed. Instead, it served as a drain on German 
resources which the Wehrmacht could ill afford. The more logical 
assignment for the Luftwaffe in the spring of 19^1 would have "been the 
capture of Malta. 
Hitler's primary reason for choosing Crete rather than Malta was 
his concern for the securement of the southern flank prior to the inva­
sion of Russia, The German timetable did not allow for the retransfer of 
forces to Sicily for the capture of ̂ ^Ita "before the opening of Operation 
Barbarossa. Hitler believed that the campaign against the Soviet Union 
would end the war and therefore attached little strategic importance to 
the central Mediterranean. The Fuehrer intended the capture of Crete to 
be the culmination of German operations in the Mediterranean, and 
immediately after the conclusion of the battle O.K.W, assigned the major 
part of the Luftwaffe's Mediterranean forces to Barbarossa. Crete, an 
island of little strategic value, saved Malta, the objective of real 
decisive importance for Axis hopes in the Mediterranean. 
^Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won. I5I. 
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The summer of 1941 was an interim period for German operations 
in the Mediterranean, and the area once again "became an Italian concern. 
The total commitment of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front meant that 
few reinforcements were available for the Mediterranean theater. Once 
free of the Luftwaffe attack, British air and submarine forces from 
Malta again interdicted the Axis convoys to North Africa, "but not until 
the situation approached the disaster stage did Hitler reluctantly agree 
to the return of the Luftwaffe to Sicily. 
The second phase of German Intervention in the Mediterranean was 
on a far larger scale than the first phase. But the return of the 
Luftwaffe did not change the basic format of German strategy toward 
Malta, Once again Hitler relied on air attack alone to neutralize the 
island and alleviate the problem of the Axis convoys in crossing the 
Sicilian Straits with supplies for the Afrika Korps. 
In his decision to neutralize Malta by air attack. Hitler 
ignored the lessons of the previous year—that once the air raids had 
ended, Malta would again gain its offensive capability. But Hitler 
again sought no long term objectives in the Mediterranean theater. The 
heavy losses sustained by the airborne units at Crete certainly deterred 
the Fuehrer from further operations of this nature, but the primary 
reason for a limited policy toward Malta was that Hitler was unconvinced 
that the island warranted such an extensive commitment of the Wehrmacht. 
Hitler chose to ignore the argument of those, such as General Student, 
who believed that much had been learned at Crete that would be of value 
in reducing the casualties in similar airborne operations. Instead, the 
Fuehrer relied on a rapid termination of the Luftwaffe assignment 
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against Malta 'before its withdrawal for duty elsewhere. 
The German air attack on Malta during the winter and spring of 
19k2 temporarily neutralized the island as an offensive base. The 
effect on the desert campaign was immediate, and by January 19^2 the 
situation in the central Mediterranean had changed entirely. Eommel 
took the offensive in Cyrenaica while Malta fought for its survival. In 
any war, logistics is a prime necessity for victory; in North Africa 
this was emphatically the case. Throughout the North African war the 
success of the Afrika Korps operated in direct relationship to the 
strength or weakness of British forces operating from Malta, 
The realization of vita's importance to the Mediterranean 
theater of war led to Britain's determination to maintain the island as 
a naval and air station, while on "the other side of the hill" German 
military advisers, particularly the Naval Staff, sought to win the 
Fuehrer's approval for the capture of the island. The arguments of 
Admiral Eaeder and Field Marshal Kesselring, however, were offset by the 
latter's encouraging reports on the success of the Luftwaffe in achie­
ving the neutralization of Malta, which to Hitler seemed to justify the 
policy of neutralization by air attack, Kesselring's intention, however, 
was for the Wehrmacht to follow up the Luftwaffe's success "by a land 
invasion. The Commander-in-Chief South was aware that Malta could "be 
suppressed only so long as the Luftwaffe continued its massive air raids, 
a situation which he realized was impossible to maintain because of the 
need of air support in other areas, particularly on the Eastern front» 
The German High Command showed little interest when, in January 
1941, the Italians began preparations to capture the island. Field 
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Wiarshal Keitel and General Jodl, who in the spring of 19^1 had been firm 
advocates of capturing the island, were reluctant to cooperate with 
Commando Supremo in a combined operation, and, aware of Hitler's opinion 
on the subject, they did not care to champion the proposal to him. It 
was not until April lSk2 that 0»K.W, became convinced of Italy's deter­
mination to carry out the invasion and added its support to the argu­
ments of the Naval Staff and Eesselring that Germany should participate 
in the operation with her Axis partnero Although Hitler did not agree 
with his military advisers on the Importance of capturing Malta, he gave 
his approval at the Berchtesgaden conference on 30 April. 
Hitler's commitment to Operation Herkules meant a basic change 
in German policy in the Mediterranean. For the first and only time 
during the war, the Axis began joint planning for a combined operation. 
At Berchtesgaden, however, the Axis leaders had also decided that the 
next major objective of the Mediterranean theater would be Rommel's 
Summer offensive. This decision placed ffelta in a secondary position in 
the Axis timetable, but because of the unpreparedness of the Axis forces 
assigned to capture the island, no other decision could be reached. 
Eoumel was disappointed that the Axis could not capture the island 
before the Afrika Korps' attack, but he had been disappointed in this 
respect ever since his arrival in Africa, Rommel did not intend for his 
offensive to upset the planning for Operation Herkules. More than any 
other military leader, he saw the necessity for capturing the island and 
continually urged O.K.V. and Commando Supremo to undertake such an 
operation. Yet in the spring of 19^2 the Commander of the Afrika Kbrps 
had no choice but to take the offensive before the British 8th Army took 
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the initiative. 
This first postponement of Operation Herkules, in favor of the 
desert offensive, met little opposition from German advocates of the 
capture of Malta. O.K.W,, Admiral Eaeder, and Field Marshal Kesselrlng 
all approved the decision reached at Berchtesgaden, It was only later, 
when Eommel decided to continue his advance into Egypt, that the major 
controversy arose. The question, "became Jfelta or Suez, and Hitler chose 
the latter. This second postponement of Operation Herkules ended the 
chance to capture the Island. With Alexandria and the Kile only 100 
land miles away, Eommel reached a stalemate at 11 Alamein, and "by the 
end of July Operation Herkules was finally cancelled. 
It is ironic that Commando Supremo, and certain German military 
advisers such as Field Marshal Kesselrlng, should "blame Rommel for 
Germany's failure to capture ^^Ita. The Italian General Staff had 
warned of the danger of launching an extended offensive without first 
securing the Axis supply line across the Mediterranean by capturing 
Ifelta, Althoiigh Rommel would have been the first to agree with Commando 
Supremo, he faced an immediate tactical situation after the fall of 
Tobruk, The pursuit and destruction of the enemy's forces was a basic 
military principle, the violation of which could have jeopardized the 
tactical gains of the Afrlka Korps and reversed all previous German 
military doctrine. While it is true that Rommel overextended his 
position, he did so In the belief that the necessary supplies would be 
forthcoming. Once he realized that his hopes were unfounded, he 
requested permission to withdraw. But Hitler and Mussolini refused his 
request. 
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For 18 months Rommel had pleaded for the capture of Malta as the 
solution to the supply problem of the Afrika Korps. In March 19^1 he 
had even offered to capture the island with his own forces, "but O.K.W. 
refused his offer. Although Rommel gambled in his attempt to reach the 
Nile in July 19^2, It was his intention to prevent the enemy from 
regaining the initiative and not to forestall the capture of Malta, 
Kesselrlng's observation that Hitler postponed the capture of Malta 
2 
because he was "under the hypnotic influence of Rommel" is far from the 
truth, for Hitler had already decided that Operation Herkules would not 
be carried out. 
Hitler's commitment to Operation Herkules on 30 April 19^2 
lasted exactly three weeks. No sooner had he agreed to the plan than he 
offered a new series of arguments why the operation should not be carried 
out. In conference with his military advisers. Hitler based his decision 
on the reluctance and inability of Italy to perform such a hazardous 
operation. He distrusted the aggressiveness of the Italian fleet, the 
fighting quality of the Italian soldier, and the ability of the Italian 
General Staff to maintain secrecy. 
Although Hitler was convinced that the vicissitudes of the 
Italian Armed Forces could seriously handicap a combined operation, the 
reasons he advanced for postponing Operation Herkules were more excuses 
than strategic reasoning. The problems of Axis cooperation in the 
capture of Malta had largely been overcome through the efforts of Field 
Marshal Kesselring and General Student, At the conference with Hitler 
^Eesselrlng, A Soldier's Record. 1^7. 
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in May 19^2, Student had expressed his belief that the Italian troops 
appeared more than adequate for the task, and these same troops, the 
Folgore regiment, proved their quality at El Alamein, Admiral Eaeder 
had also deemphasized the need for vigorous action by the Italian fleet 
to insure a successful operation. Hitler, however, chose to ignore 
their arguments. As for secrecy, Britain was aware that such an under­
taking was in the offing, and there was little possibility that such a 
mammoth operation could achieve sui^rise in any case. More basic 
reasons prompted Hitler to abandon Operation Herkules. 
The primary reason why Germany never captured Malta was Hitler's 
belief that the island could be bypassed, that it was unimportant in the 
grand strategy of the "Great Plan," Hitler considered Suez the main 
goal of Axis efforts in the Mediterranean. However, he believed that 
Suez and the entire Middle East could be secured in a pincer movement 
from both the east, through the Caucasus, and the west, from Cyrenaica, 
to the Nile. The linking up of the Afrika Korps and Army Group South at 
Suez would complete the destruction of Britain in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, In comparison with such grandiose dreams, the capture 
of Malta appeared insignificant. 
It cannot be said that Hitler simply did not realize the strate­
gic Importance of Malta and the effect of British operations from the 
island on the land battle in North Africa; he acknowledged the island's 
importance by directing the massive Luftwaffe raids to its neutraliza­
tion. But the Fuehrer did not appreciate the total situation. He 
believed that Malta held strategic importance only if Britain held 
Cyrenaica, forcing Axis convoys to sail to Tripolitania and thus within 
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range of British air and naval units operating from felta. The Fuehrer 
considered that once "the Afrika Korps controlled Cyrenaica, Malta no 
longer held any strategic importance. 
Hitler's basic mistake was his belief that Malta could be 
bypassed. This judgment did not take into account the geography of the 
area. The great majority of Italian shipping sailed from the western 
coast of Italy south through the Sicilian Straits, or passed through the 
Straits of Messina before heading across the Mediterranean to Libya. 
Other convoys sailed east along the Greek coast, then south to Crete and 
Cyrenaica. Whatever course the convoys took, they were sighted in their 
initial departure, or soon after, by reconnaissance aircraft and subma­
rines from Malta, Even If the Island's offensive capability were 
reduced by air attack, the Island always maintained itself as a recon­
naissance station, a watchtower, over the sailings of Italian shipping 
and informed British naval and air units based In Egypt of enemy 
movements. Neutralization by air attack was not enough to offset 
Malta's strategic importance. Only if the Island could be starved into 
submission by a complete blockade could such a policy be successful. 
And the Luftwaffe was unable to prevent supplies from reaching the 
Island.3 
Although the primary reason for Hitler's decision not to capture 
ffelta was his reliance on the "Great Plan," the Fuehrer probably would 
not have attempted the capture of Ifelta for a number of other reasons. 
Hitler expected that the capture of the island would be "fanatically" 
^See Appendix B. 
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resisted, and the near disaster of Crete was not forgotten. Goerlng, a 
constant critic of invasion of Malta, warned Hitler that heavy casual­
ties could "be expected and that success was far from certain. Hitler 
was not prepared to accept heavy losses in the capture of Malta, when 
such units, particularly the Luftfc^ffe, were in constant demand on the 
Eastern front. The Russian campaign always held the major attention of 
the Fuehrer, and in the question of priority Malta and the Mediterranean 
theater in general ranked a poor second. Hitler's temporary decision to 
capture the island in April 1942 was probably taken to satisfy Musso­
lini 's request for a final settlement of the convoy problem to North 
Africa. At the first opportunity. Hitler reneged on his commitment and 
ordered Operation Herkules to be continued only on paper. Rommel's 
success in Cyrenaica presented an alternative to the capture of Malta. 
The fall of Tobruk, then, only gave the Fuehrer the opportunity 
to postpone the capture of Malta with the approval of his Axis partner. 
Hitler needed no urging from Eommal to approve the advance of the Afrika 
Korps; and Mussolini, O.K.W., and the Geiman Naval Staff all expressed 
their approval of Hitler's decision. Only Kesselring, Weichold, and 
Cavallero expressed their disagreement, and this opposition did not 
concern the advance from Tobruk, but rather only how far the advance 
into Egypt should continue. At El Alamein, however, the opportunity to 
capture Malta passed forever. 
To say that the failure to capture Malta caused Rommel's defeat 
at El Alamein is an oversimplification. The Afrika Korps ' drive to the 
Nile was first of all halted by stiff, determined British resistance. 
It was only later, when the initial battle became a stalemate and when 
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Eltler refused to allow Eommel to retreat, that the final outcome became 
dependent on the supply factor. In the last analysis, logistics made El 
Alamein a tattle that Rommel could not vin and tiiat Montgomery eould not 
lose. Malta, like the legendary Phoenix, arose from its ashes and 
proved to be the decisive factor in interdicting the Axis supply route 
to Worth Africa, and thus in the ultimate defeat of the Afrika Kbrps, 
In considering the possibilities of the Axis to capture Malta, 
one must conclude that Italy could have secured the island in the first 
days of the Mediterranean war with little difficulty. Britain, with 
only three aircraft to defend Malta, could not have prevented an Italian 
victory. Germany repeated the error of her Axis partner when, in the 
first phase of her intervention into the Mediterranean, Hitler relied on 
air attack alone to neutralize the island. Hitler then compounded his 
error by capturing Crete, rather than Malta. In the third and final 
opportunity to capture the island. Hitler again relied on the Luftwaffe 
attack on l%lta to secure the central Mediterranean. Although Hitler 
reversed this strategy in April and the decision was made for a land 
invasion, the most favorable opportunity had already passed. 
For a successful invasion of Malta, total air superiority was a 
primary requisite. This situation had been achieved during the first 
week of April, before the training for Operation Herkules had been 
completed. The Axis was not prepared to execute the operation until the 
first of July and In this interim--between the time of the neutraliza­
tion of Ifelta's air forces and the proposed date of invasion—-the 
balance of air superiority had already begun to shift in favor of the 
British. Because of this situation, Malta could not have been captured 
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"by a coup de main in the period "between the fall of Totruk and the first 
of July^ as the Axis timetable had originally planned, Malta's recovery 
during the summer of 1^42 had been substantial, as indicated by the 
failure of the final "îfelta Blitz," The decision to capture Malta had 
come too late to coincide with the main force of the Luftwaffe attack. 
The lack of cooperation between the Ajcis partners, the failure 
to take advantage of the opportunities for complete victory in Korth 
Africa, and, above all, the failure to capture Malta, forestalled Axis 
hopes in the Mediterranean and insured an Inevitable defeat. 
APPEISDIX A 
By By By From 
Month Submarine Aircraft Mine Other Total 
Causes 
June 3 - 3,107 2 - 12,249 1 - 1,600 6 - 16,956 
July 3 - 8,603 4 - 19,467 7 - 28,070 
Aug. 2 - 14,145 7 - 20,981 9 - 35,126 
Sept. 4 ~ 41,534 6 - 23,031 1 - 389 11 - 64,954 
Total 12 - 67,389 19 - 75,728 1-389 1 - 1,600 33 - 145,106 
CARGOES DISEMBARKED IN NOBTH AFRICA AND PERCENTAGE LOST ON PASSAGE 
Cargo 
Disembarked Percentage 
Month Type in Lost 
North Africa on the Way 
(Tons) 
June General Military Cargo 89,226 6 
Fuel 35,850 -
July General Military Cargo 50,700 12 
Fuel 12,000 41 
Aug. Cteneral Military Cargo 46,700 20 
Fuel 37,200 1 
Sept. General Military Cargo 54,000 29 
Fuel 13,400 24 
38
Î ECENTAG3
Gener
 
The first table is taken from Playfair, The Mediterranean and 
Middle East. II, 281, The second table is taken from Bragadin, The 
Italian Navy in World War II. Appendix, and Playfair. The average 
monthly total of Axis shipping losses from June to September is double 
that of the first five months of the year, and thus reflects the with­
drawal of the Luftwaffe. 
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NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF ITALIAN AND GERMAN MERCHANT SHIPS OF OVER 5OO TONS 
SUNK AT SEA OR IN PORT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
JUNE-SEPTEMBER I9k2^ 
(Compiled from Italian post-war and German war records) 
By 
Month Surface 
Ships 
June 
July 2 
Aug. 
Sept, 
By 
Sutmarine 
3,877 
2 
1 
7 
5 
By 
Aircraft 
2,565 
792 
40,036 
13,249 
3 
4 
3 
5 
By 
Mine 
16,701 1 
10,919 
12,020 1 
20,948 
By 
Combined 
Naval 
and Air 
Action 
750 
4,894 1 
2 
6 
7 
8,326 12 
2,737 12 
Total 
20,016 
15,588 
65,276 
36,934 
Total 2 - 3,877 15 - 56,642 15 - 60,588 2 - 5,644 3 - 11,063 37 - 137,814 
CARGOES DISEMBARKED IN NORTH AFRICA AND PERCENTAGE LOST ON PASSAGE 
Month 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept, 
Type 
General Military Cargo 
Fuel 
General Military Cargo 
Fuel 
General Military Cargo 
Fuel 
General Military Cargo 
Fuel 
Cargo 
Disembarked 
in 
North Africa 
(Tons) 
26,759 
5,568 
67,590 
23,901 
29,155 
22,500 
46,165 
31,061 
Percentage 
Lost 
on the Way 
23 
17 
6 
25 
41 
20 
Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East. Ill, 327, and 
Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II. Appaidix. These statistics 
provide an analysis of the Axis convoy shipments and arrivals during the 
critical period of Rommel's advance through Cyrenaica and stalemate at 
El Alamein. These tatles do not include ships of less than 5OO tons. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE SUPPLY OF MALTA^ 
January 1941 to August 1942 
Date 
of Convoy or Ship 
Arrival 
1941 
10 Jan, During Op. Excess 
23 Mar. M,W.6 
21 Apr. Breconshire 
( Apr, ) Parracoaibe 
10 May During Op. Tiger 
21 July Op, Substance 
19 Sep. Empire Guillemot 
24 Sep, Op. Ealberi 
Empire Pelican 
Empire Defender 
18 Dec. Breconshire 
1942 
7 Jan. Glaagyle 
18 Jan. M.F.3 
27 Jan. Breconshire 
(Feb.) M.F.5 
23 Mar. M.G.I 
10 May Welshman 
15 June Op, Harpoon 
15 June Welshman 
(June) Op, Vigorous 
16 July Welshman 
14 Aug. Op. Pedestal 
Total 
Supply Ships Cargo 
Unloaded 
Started Arrived in Tons 
3 3 78,000 
4 4 
1 1 7,000 
1 0 
7 7 40,000 
6 6 40,000 
11 6,000 
9 8 50,000 
2 0 
1 1  7 , 0 0 0  
1 1 7,000 
4 3 21,000 
1 1 7,000 
3 - 0 
4 3 7,500 
1 1 300 
6 2 15,000 
I 1 300 
11 0 
II 300 
14 5 47,000 
82 49 334,400 
^his table is taken from Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle 
East. Ill, 324. Although there are many such figures available, those 
by Playfair appear to be the most accurate. During this period there 
•were also 3I supply trips by submarine, the cargoes of which were small 
and are not indicated in this table. Of the 33 ships which sailed for 
but did not arrive at Malta, 10 turned back and 23 were sunk at sea. 
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* * * 
Although the documentary evidence for German military strategy 
in World Wax II is extensive, there are few sources which are devoted 
exclusively to the conduct of the Mediterranean theater of war. The 
documentary sources for a study of German strateQr toward Malta are 
often fragmentary. A najor exception is Admiral Weichold's Axis Naval 
Policy in the Mediterranean, an excellent account of the interrelation-
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ship of the war at sea and the North African desert campai©!. Weichold's 
thesis is that German leaders were consistently land-minded and ignored 
the significance of naval strategy in their conduct of the war, Althoii^ 
Weichold at times overstates his case, his account of the Mediterranean 
war is generally fair, accurate, and was of great aid in the writing of 
this paper. The second monograph "by Weichold, The War at Sea, is not as 
complete and Is often written more from memory than from recorded data. 
The Krleg:stages"buch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht is an excel­
lent source for the decisions of 0,K.W,; however, for the year 19^2 it 
is incomplete with many gaps in time. Much of the original data for 
this year was destroyed, tut part of the evidence has teen replaced from 
other sources. For Hitler's War Directives, Tjoth Hubatsch's Hitlers 
Welsungen fur die Kriegfuehrung and Trevor-Eoper's English-annotated 
edition. Blitzkrieg to Defeat, have been used. Unfortunately, however, 
both works are Incomplete and neither includes Hitler's directive for 
Operation Herkules, Lossberg's Im Wehrngtchtfuehrungsstab gives occa­
sional glimpses of Geman strategy in the Mediterranean and the problems 
of the Axis alliance, as does Heuslnger's Hitler et I'O.K.H. 
One of the most important sources for German strategy toward 
Malta is the Fuehrer Conferences on tfeitters Dealing with ite German Navy. 
At these conferences Admiral. Eaeder consistently presented the possibil­
ities for Germany to capture tfelta, and it is one of the few sources 
which gives detail on the subject. The Eommel Papers is, of course, 
extremely important for the North African campaign. Written In the most 
part by Eommel himself, with valuable annotations by Liddell Hart, it 
ençhasizes that Eommel's major problem was lack of supplies. The 
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Detartment of State Bulletin provided translations of important confer­
ences between the Axis leaders» The record of the meeting at Schloss 
ELessheim was especially helpful. Documents on German Foreign Policy. 
althotigh politically oriented^ was most useful in Volumes XII and XIII 
of Series D, the war years, for the correspondence "between Hitler and 
tWsolinl. 
The unpublished material provided valuable information for the 
chapter on Operation Herkules and in assessing Germany's commitment to 
the invasion of Malta in the spring of 1942. Selbt's report on "Prepar­
ations for the Capture of Malta" dealt with logistical preparations, 
while Conrad's "Preparations for the Commitment of Parachute and Other 
Airborne IMlts" dealt with the problems of an airborne operation. 
The multivolume works, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression and Trials 
of the Ma.lor War Criminals, provide a wealth of Information on Geiman 
policy, but not for the Mediterranean theater of war. Little use was 
made of these works in writing on German strategy In the Mediterranean. 
The Haider Diary also provided little information on the Mediterranean 
theater but dealt almost exclusively with the offensive against the 
Soviet Union. Hitler's Secret Conversations, an account of the Fuehrer's 
intimate digressions, also has little application for a study of the war 
on the southern front but provides interesting sidelights on Hitler's 
character and outlook on various subjects. Hitler Directs His War is a 
record of selected conferences of the Fuehrer but often deals more with 
political philosophy than with military strategy, 
* * * 
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New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, 
* * * 
-127-
The diaries^ personal accounts, etc., of the various partici­
pants in WorM War II are often of much value to the war historian. One 
of the most valuable for writing of German strategy in the Mediterranean 
is Eesselring, A Soldier's Becord. Eesselring's memoirs as Commander-
in-Chief South provide details on the Luftwaffe assault on Malta and the 
operational planning for Operation Herkulea. Although sometimes biased, 
as Kesselring attempts to prove that he was only a soldier doing his 
duty, the took is a good account of the Luftwaffe's role in the Mediter­
ranean and for the disputes concerning Malta or Suez, Another excellent 
personal account is Warlimont's Inside Hitler's Headquarters, which 
describes the relationship of Hitler to 0,K,W, It provides a good 
account of decision making in the German High Command, Warlimont is 
critical of Hitler's Mediterranean strategy and at times of his 0,K,¥, 
superiors, Keitel and Jodl, also. 
Admiral Eaeder's My Life is a good account of the building of 
the Geman Navy in the 1930s and of the development of naval strategy in 
World Wiar II, Although this work was used sparingly, since the Fuehrer 
Conferences provided most of the necessary information, the book was 
valuable for Eaeder's opposition to the Fuehrer's naval policy. Admiral 
Doenitz 's Memoirs : Ten Years and Twenty Days is primarily concerned 
with the submarine warfare in the Atlantic until 19^3 when he succeeded 
Eaeder as CIC Wavy. It is a most interesting account by the master of 
"wolf pack" tactics, but since Doenitz had little interest in the Medi­
terranean, it is not important for German strategy in that area. 
The Ciano Diaries provides a day-by-day account by the Italian 
Foreign Minister in World War II, Althou^ the work is biased in favor 
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of the author's personal views^ it is an in^ortant source for a study of 
Italian war strategy» Unfortunately, Ciano makes almost no mention of 
Malta, proba'bly an unpleasant subject. Mussolini's Memoirs begins in 
October I9k2 and therefore is of little value in studying strategy in 
the first two years of the Mediterranean war. The Memoirs of Field 
Marshal Keitel. an interesting and informative account by the former 
Chief of if not always objective, is valuable for the relation­
ship of OoK.Wo to Hitler and the three services. Keitel deals little 
with the Mediterremean, althou^ he favored an extension of the Wehr-
macht to that theater. 
Rintèlen's Mussolini als Bundesgenosse is of primary importance 
in a study of German Mediterranean strategy. As German Liaison Officer 
in Rome from 193^ to I943, Eintelen's account of the problems of the 
Axis alliance, the cooperation of Italy in the war effort, and the 
failures of German strategy provide a clear, informative, and generally 
unbiased account of the war In the Medi terranean. Eintelen is sympa­
thetic to Germany's Axis ally, but this does not detract from the 
veracity of his account» 
Adolf Galland's The First and the Last is a personal account of 
the air war by caae of the Luftwaffe's top aces. Galland participated in 
the "Malta Blitz" in the sunmer of 19^2 and is highly critical of 
Goering's constant intervention in the tactical mission of -tile Luftwaffe 
in the Mediterranean » The attack on Malta, however, receives little 
attention» Cunningham's A Sailor's Odyssey deals alnnst exclusively 
with the Mediterranean war and is a personal, well written, and highly 
informative account of the sea war from the British viewpoint. Cunning-
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ham typifies the indomitable^ doughty British admiral, who "believed that 
for Britain the Mediterranean was the "sea of decision." 
* * * 
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The secondary works on World War II, many by noted war histor­
ians, have often been an Important aid in examining German strategy in 
the Mediterran^m, One of the more Important for the purposes of this 
paper was Deakin's The Brutal Friendship. This excellent, extremely 
well docuzmntBd account of "Sie relationship between Hitler and Mussolini 
and "the development of Axis strategy has been most valuable. It Is well 
written, clear, and unbiased, and represents a major addition to the 
history of World War II. Elrkpatrick's Mussolini, the companion volume 
to Bullock's Hitler, is valuable in its analysis of the Duce and the 
origin and structure of Italian fascism» Bragadin's The Italian Navy in 
World War II is generally unreliable because of the author's bias, but 
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it explains in detail the problems of the Italian Navy and its statis­
tics on the losses of the merchant fleet are fairly accurate. 
Belot's The Struggle for the Mediterranean is generally fair, 
acciarate, and written primarily from documentary evidence. It was of 
special value as it is written primarily from the German and Italian 
view. Assman's Deutsche Schicksals.iahre is written from the point of 
view of the German Navy and covers the entire war at sea. A portion of 
the work is devoted to the Mediterranean theater, which the author feels 
was slighted by the German High Command, luge's Per Seekrieg also 
expresses the naval view in the conduct of the sea war and adds the 
author's criticism of the Supreme Command for the opportunities lost in 
the Mediterranean theater. Decisive Battles of World War II: The 
German View was used for the valuable account of German Mediterranean 
strategy written by Walter Warlimont. Manstein, in Lost Victories. 
devotes little attention to the Mediterranean theater of war, although 
he consideï'ed the failure to capture ^feilta a colossal blunder. 
Unfortunately for the study of German strategy in World War H, 
no complete study of Goering is available. Sources that are available, 
such as ffenvell and Fraenkel's Goering. are extremely limited. For a 
study of the career of Hitler, the classic work is Bullock's Hitler. A 
Study in Tyranny» Although there is little on German strategy in the 
Mediterranean, it is valuable for an understanding of the Fuehrer and 
the Third Reich. 
Martienssen's Hitler »nd His Admivmla is written almost entirely 
from documentary materials, but as these have been generally available, 
Martienssen's study has been used li^tly. Liddell Hart's The German 
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Genemlfl Talk is an interesting and often valuable record of conversa­
tions with many of the major German generals after the defeat of Germany. 
The most useful for the Mediterranean theater was the conversation with 
General Student» 
British sources have covered in every aspect the history of tiae 
Mediterranean war» For a complete analysis of British strategy in World 
War H, Churchill's six volume work is unsurpassed. The Hinge of Fate, 
fourth volume in the series, was the most valuable for the Mediterranean 
war, although specific details are often lacking. The major source for 
Britain in the Mediterranean is I, S. 0. Playfair's official British 
history. The Mediterranean and Middle East. This work, although from 
the British view, is an extremely valuable, detailed account of British 
strategy and tactics, both at sea and in the land canç)algns, Althou^ 
undocumented, the author had full access to British files. Mac in tyre's 
The Battle for the Mediterranean unfortunately is undocumented, but tdie 
author's account of the war in the Mediterranean, with Malta as the 
focal point, was very useful. Particularly Important was the account of 
the Luftwaffe raids on ïfelta. Ian Cameron's Bed Duster. White Ensign 
discusses in detail the British supply of Malta, but it is a hi^ly 
prejudiced account. Other works, such as Malta Magnificent and Malta 
Strikes Back, are nearly worthless, although the latter at least dis­
cussed Malta's defense preparations. 
Of the otdier secondary works available, few have been used to 
any great degree, and they provided only an occasional aid. 
